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PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: IS ILLINOIS
"PLAYING HOOKY"?
Upon the subject of education, not presuming to dictate any plan or system
respecting it, I can only say that I view it as a most important subject which
we as a people can be engaged in. That every man may receive at least a
moderate education and thereby be able to read the histories of his own and
other countries, from which he may appreciate the value of our free institu-
tions, appears to be an object of vital importance.'
-Abraham Lincoln
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Constitution does not contain a provision'that requires the Fed-
eral Government to maintain a system of free public schools. Consequently,
the Supreme Court has viewed education as a primarily local concern. Absent
a clear constitutional violation, such as racial segregation, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant to intervene in disputes involving education.' As a result,
advocates of school finance reform have turned to state constitutional
provisions.3
1. 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, DECEMBER 8,
1969-SEPTEMBER 3, 1970, at 762 (Illinois State Bar Ass'n ed., 1970) [hereinafter RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS] (Paul E. Mathias, Chairman of the Committee on Education, quoting Abraham
Lincoln).
2. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973). The Rodri-
guez Court stated:
[Educational policy is an] area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge
and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments
made at the state and local levels .... [T]he judiciary is well advised to refrain from
imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or
handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial
solutions to educational problems ....
Id.; see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982) ("In assuring that the require-
ments of the [Education of the Handicapped] Act have been met, courts must be careful to avoid
imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States."). But cf., e.g., Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that while education is not a fundamental right subject to
strict scrutiny, a state can justify a denial of education only by showing that the denial furthers
some substantial state interest); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that
where" a state has chosen to provide education to its citizens it must make education available to
all on equal terms).
3. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (advocates challenging New Jersey's
public school finance system via New Jersey's education clause, N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para.
1); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (challenging Texas' public
school finance system via Texas' education clause, TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1); Kukor v. Grover,
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A particularly controversial dispute involving education focuses on the
methods by which states fund public education. Since local school districts use
real estate property tax revenues to fund their schools, and since taxable prop-
erty values often vary from school district to school district within each state,
school districts within a state often raise a disparate amount of money for
education.4 Each state government attempts to alleviate the fundraising dis-
parities that exist between its school districts; however, even after the state
provides its aid to the school districts that need it, large disparities in per-pupil
expenditures between school districts often persist.5 The school reform move-
ment seeks to alter the fundraising schemes in various states so that the money
available to each school district for education matches the amount of money
that each school district needs to adequately educate its pupils.
Advocates of school finance reform have claimed victory under numerous
state constitutions.6 Illinois, however, remains an unreformed state despite the
fact that, in fiscal year 1988, expenditures per pupil in Illinois public schools
ranged from approximately $12,900 to less than $2100.' Indeed, the Commit-
tee for Educational Rights-fifty-five Illinois public school districts, and a
number of school children and their parents-recently filed a lawsuit against
the state's governor, school superintendent, and state board of education, al-
leging that the school finance system in Illinois is unconstitutional under the
Illinois Constitution.8 This Comment focuses on four different arguments, any
one of which mandates school finance reform in Illinois.
First, this Comment argues that the Illinois courts are not properly inter-
preting the education clause in the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The courts have
not adjusted their analysis of the language of the education clause, although it
was redrafted in 1970.
Second, this Comment demonstrates that the deferential position toward
school finance taken by the Illinois courts is inconsistent with their own deci-
sions involving the public education of handicapped students. It argues that
the Illinois courts should maintain the same active role in school finance re-
form that they have maintained in the area of public education for the
handicapped.
Third, this Comment demonstrates that other state courts have appropri-
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (challenging Wisconsin's public school finance system via Wiscon-
sin's education clause, WIs. CONST. art. 10, § 3, and Wisconsin's equal protection clause, Wis.
CONST. art. 1, § 1).
4. See infra notes 99-139 and accompanying text (discussing the different methods of financing
public education).
5. See infra notes 99-139 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 83 (listing citations to successful challenges to public school finance systems in
California, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, and Texas).
7. Thomas L. Burroughs & Robert Leininger, State, Local, and Federal Financing for Illinois
Public Schools 20 (Apr. 1990) (unpublished report, on file with the DePaul Law Review).
8. Complaint of Petitioner, Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, No. 90 CH- 11097
(Cir. Ct. of Cook County, filed Nov. 13, 1990). Plaintiffs filed the complaint in the Circuit Court
of Cook County on November 13, 1990-the first day of National Education Week.
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ately given extensive interpretations to the education clauses of their state con-
stitutions, while Illinois courts have been unduly hesitant to interpret broadly
the Illinois Constitution's education clause. Consequently, unlike courts in
other states, Illinois courts have refused to apply a heightened judicial review
to the school finance issue. This Comment argues that the Illinois courts' inter-
pretation of the education clause in the Illinois Constitution and their deferen-
tial position toward school finance have been undermined by school finance
litigation in other states.
Finally, this Comment criticizes the Illinois courts' equal protection clause
analysis in the school finance reform area. It argues that the courts' analysis is
inconsistent with the federal equal protection analysis that the Illinois courts
have claimed to adopt.
I. BACKGROUND
A court's consideration of whether Illinois must reform its school finance
system necessarily involves analysis of the federal law, case law from outside
Illinois, the Illinois Constitution, and, of course, Illinois case law. Federal
equal protection adjudication is important because the United States Supreme
Court's equal protection decisions9 have compelled advocates of school finance
reform to seek remedial action in state courts. Case law from outside Illinois is
important since courts in other states have interpreted their less demanding
education clauses to mandate school finance reform.1" The Illinois Constitution
is important because it contains two clauses that arguably mandate school fi-
nance reform: the education clause11 and the equal protection clause.12 Illinois
case law regarding education for the handicapped is also important because it
demonstrates the willingness of Illinois courts to interpret the education clause
broadly so that it mandates an "appropriate" education for each pupil in light
of his or her individual needs.1 s
A. Federal Equal Protection Analysis
Early advocates of public school finance reform sought protection from the
federal judiciary. The Federal Constitution, however, contains no provision
that requires the Federal Government to provide a system of free schools.1 '
9. See infra notes 47-81 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court
decisions on public school finance based upon the Equal Protection Clause).
10. See infra notes 141-204 and accompanying text (analyzing New Jersey and Texas Supreme
Court decisions that found the public school finance systems in their states unconstitutional under
the education clauses in their state constitutions).
11. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
12. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
13. See infra notes 331-35 (discussing Illinois decisions that interpret the Illinois education
clause as granting the right to an "appropriate" education for handicapped students).
14. See Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 239, 241-42 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1984).
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Consequently, advocates attacked the constitutionality of school finance sys-
tems via the more general Federal Equal Protection Clause.' 5 The Equal Pro-
tection Clause compels the government to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. 6 However, while the clause prohibits the government
from making arbitrary classifications and from basing classifications on imper-
missible criteria,'17 it does not prohibit the government from classifying indi-
viduals entirely.18 Where the government's classification relates to a proper
governmental purpose, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause."0 It is
this relationship between governmental purpose and classification that controls
equal protection adjudication."0 This relationship is subject to three standards
of review, which at the extremes require either a very strong relationship or
merely a rational relationship.
Three "levels of scrutiny" are critical in any equal protection adjudication.2'
These three levels of judicial scrutiny are minimal, intermediate, and strict."
A court's conclusion as to whether a federal equal protection challenge will be
successful depends a great deal upon the level of judicial scrutiny it applies.2
Minimal scrutiny is the most deferential level of judicial review. In a mini-
mal scrutiny analysis, a court will ask whether it is conceivable that the classi-
fication bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental end.2 ' Since
1937, courts have used minimal scrutiny in reviewing social and economic leg-
islation.25 Under the minimal scrutiny standard, a court attaches a presump-
15. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. See JOHN E. NOwAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 525-26 (3d ed. 1986).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 525.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 528-37; see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure.: The Coming Break-
down of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 161-63 (1984).
21. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 16, at 528-37; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1436-1625 (2d. ed. 1988); Shaman, supra note 20, at 161-63.
22. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 16, at 530-33.
23. Id. at 529.
24. Id. at 530.
25. Id. (noting that minimal scrutiny arose when the Supreme Court renunciated the idea of
substantive due process around 1937). From 1887 to 1937, the Court used the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause to strike down social welfare or economic legislation with
which the Justices fundamentally disagreed. The Court did not defer to legislative decisions, but
instead independently decided what ends the government might pursue to justify the legislation.
Thus, the Court decided whether legislation met the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause
or the Due Process Clause based upon their own views of the government's role in a free economy.
When the Court renounced the theory of substantive due process in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), it also rejected the theory that the Court had the ability to independently
determine the reasonableness of classifications when reviewing laws under the Equal Protection
Clause. However, the Court did not abandon its rigid standard of review for protecting those
values that the Court believed were fundamental. Consequently, today a dichotomy exists between
the standard of review for general social and welfare legislation (minimal scrutiny), and the stan-
dard of review for classifications that touch upon fundamental constitutional values or use a crite-
rion for the classification that itself violates a constitutional value (strict scrutiny). NOWAK ET AL.,
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tion of constitutionality to the legislation." Indeed, the presumption is very
difficult to overcome.2 7 Thus, minimal scrutiny allows a high degree of defer-
ence to the actions of the legislative and executive branches of government.2 8
Intermediate scrutiny represents the second level of judicial review under
the Federal Equal Protection Clause.2 9 Intermediate'scrutiny requires govern-
mental action to be substantially related to an important governmental objec-
tive.30 Governmental classifications based on gender s' and illegitimacy, 2 for
example, are subject to intermediate scrutiny. This standard removes the pre-
sumption of constitutionality that exists under minimal scrutiny and also re-
supra note 16, at 528-43.
26. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 16, at 528-43; Shaman, supra note 20, at 162.
27. See Shaman, supra note 20, at 162 ("After the New Deal Court struggle .... the presump-
tion of constitutionality was invoked frequently, and not just as a matter of rhetoric; it quickly
became a working principle that was used as a matter of course.").
28. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.. 297 (1976) (urging that the judiciary
should not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislation made in areas
that do not affect fundamental rights or suspect classes); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955) (hypothesizing reasons as to why the legislature enacted a law where the legislature
failed to explicitly state the reasons behind its judgment); Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949) (holding that as long as the classification had some relation to the intended
purpose, and did not contain invidious discrimination, the Court would sustain the regulation
against an equal protection challenge); see also Shaman, supra note 20, at 161 & n.8 (noting that
the Supreme Court has adopted "a posture of extreme deference to the other branches of govern-
ment" in constitutional adjudication). But see'Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & O'Connor, J.J.) ("The State's ration-
ale must be something more than the exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection
between means and ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis.");
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (invalidating under the rationality test a distribution of
state oil revenues based upon the length of each citizen's residence in the state); United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding exclusion of unrelated household mem-
bers' violated the rationality test).
29. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 16, at 531-33; Shaman, supra note 20, at 162-63.
30. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (striking down a gender classification, stating
that such a classification must be "'reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike' "); Mills v. Habluetzcl, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (hold-
ing a one-year period for establishing paternity denied illegitimate children equal protection of the
law since such a classification was not substantially related to a legitimate state interest); Ma-
thews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (stating that the standard of review applied in illegiti-
macy classifications is "not a toothless one").
31. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that the Court would uphold a
gender classification only where the government was able to demonstrate that the legislation was
substantially related to an important governmental interest).
32. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (striking down a state law
which allowed full recovery by legitimate and acknowledged illegitimate children for injury to
parents, but limited recovery by unacknowledged illegitimate children, because the law was not
substantially related to an important state interest); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (hold-
ing statutes that grant a cause of action for wrongful death could not deny recovery to either
illegitimate children or their mothers, since such statutes were not substantially related to an
important state interest).
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quires a more exacting judicial review than does minimal scrutiny.33
The highest level of judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause is
strict scrutiny. 4 Strict scrutiny requires a court to examine closely the deci-
sions of the executive and judicial branches of government. 5 A court will not
presume the governmental action to be constitutional and will not uphold the
action unless it is necessarily related to a compelling state interest.36 Govern-
mental action rarely survives strict scrutiny analysis-such analysis is "strict
in theory and fatal in fact." '3 Under the Equal Protection Clause, a court will
apply strict scrutiny in two general categories of civil liberties cases: first,
when state action distinguishes between people on the basis of a "suspect
class";38 and second, when state action affects the abilities of people to exer-
cise a fundamental right.3 9 Thus, if a court deemed fundamental the right to
33. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 16, at 532.
34. Id. at 530-31.
35. Id. at 530.
36. Id. at 530-31; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that the Court
would uphold classification based upon alienage, race, or national origin only if the classification
was necessary to promote a compelling state interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(invalidating a state residency requirement for persons wishing to receive welfare benefits because,
under strict scrutiny, preservation of fiscal integrity was not compelling enough to inhibit the right
of interstate travel); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding classifica-
tions based upon race or national origin were suspect, that these classifications were to be subject
to rigid scrutiny, and that such classifications would be upheld only if they were based on public
necessity).
37. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972).
38. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Carolene
Products Court stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legis-
lation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibi-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry ...
Id.; see also, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down a voting system by
which the race of each candidate running for office was noted on the ballot, because the require-
ment would facilitate and induce racial prejudice); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(striking down the separate-but-equal doctrine as a means of public school segregation because
the doctrine discriminated against black students); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (stating classifications based upon race or national origin were inherently suspect and thus
subject to rigid judicial scrutiny).
39. Professor Nowak has identified six substantive categories of fundamental rights. NOWAK ET
AL., supra note 16, at 370-72. First, there is a fundamental right to privacy that includes different
freedoms of choice relating to an individual's personal life. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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an education, it would apply strict scrutiny to any state action that affected
the right to obtain an education.
In enacting legislation, state legislatures affect numerous public rights and
interests. For example, states often provide and regulate public housing and
welfare benefits. However, not every state action affects a right that is funda-
mental. ° The Supreme Court has defined the general characteristics of a fun-
damental right.'1 In early cases, the Court considered fundamental only those
rights it found to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'12 The right
had to be "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people" to be funda-
mental.4' Later decisions altered the Court's definition. In these decisions, a
right had to be implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution
before the Court would find it to be fundamental."
Although the Court has attempted to classify various constitutional rights,
the concept of what rights are fundamental and what rights are not is very
vague.' 5 Consequently, the list of fundamental rights is rather short.' It is not
likely, therefore, that the Supreme Court will find the right to an education a
fundamental right.
(fundamental right to choose whether or not to bear children); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (fundamental right to freedom of choice in marital decisions); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (fundamental right to procreate). Second, the Court has found a fundamental
right in the freedom to associate. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Third, the Court has held that the right to vote and to participate in the electoral process is a
fundamental right. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Fourth, the
Court has found a fundamental right to interstate travel. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). Fifth, the Court has implicitly recognized a fundamental right to fairness in the criminal
process. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right to legal materials and access to
courts); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel in first appeal). Sixth, there
is an implicit fundamental right to fairness in procedures involving governmental deprivations of
life, liberty, or property. See e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding state can
terminate parental rights only if it proves allegations of parental unfitness by clear and convincing
evidence).
40. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (holding that there is no fundamental
right to decent, safe, and sanitary housing).
41. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
42. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (noting
that the determination of whether education is fundamental depends upon whether the Constitu-
tion implicitly or explicitly guarantees it-not upon education's relative societal significance or
importance); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding the right to vote is a fundamental
right because it is guaranteed by the Constitution and it is necessary to preserve other basic civil
and political rights); Police Dep't v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to a
regulation which infringed upon freedom of speech-a fundamental right explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the rights to marry
and to procreate are among the basic civil rights of man, and thus are fundamental rights implic-
itly guaranteed by the Constitution).
45. See NOWAK Er AL.. supra note 16, at 369 ("All that can be said with certainty is that the
justices have selected a group of individual rights which do not have a specific textual basis in the
Constitution or its amendments and deemed them to be 'fundamental.' ").
46. Id. at 370-72 (listing six general categories of fundamental rights).
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B. Federal School Finance Litigation
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether education qualified
as a fundamental right in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez.' This landmark case set forth the Supreme Court's position in the area
of school finance reform.'6 In Rodriguez, the petitioner brought a class action
on behalf of school children who were members of poor families residing in
school districts with a low property tax base.' 9 The petitioner claimed that the
Texas public school finance system favored wealthier school districts and thus
violated the Federal Equal Protection Clause.50 The petitioner argued that the
system created disparities in per-pupil expenditures between districts because
of differences in property values between poorer and wealthier districts." The
Court held that wealth was not a suspect class, 51 and education was not a
fundamental right.58 Thus, the Court reasoned that the appropriate level of
judicial review was only minimal scrutiny.' The Court's opinion noted that in
no case had the Court ever applied a heightened standard of review solely
because a law burdened poor persons in the allocation of benefits that were not
deemed to be fundamental constitutional rights.5 5 Education was a govern-
mental benefit that the state could allocate unequally. 56 Accordingly, under
minimal scrutiny, the Court found the Texas school financing system consis-
tent with the Federal Equal Protection Clause.57
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
48. Regarding school finance schemes, the Rodriguez Court stated:
[T]he Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and
disposition of public revenues.... In such a complex arena in which no perfect alter-
natives exist, the court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest
all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection
Clause.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41.
Regarding the subject of education in general, the Court stated:
[Educational policy is an area] in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge
and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments
made at the state and local levels .... In such circumstances, the judiciary is well
advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that
could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to
finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-
changing conditions.
id. at 42-43.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 5-6.
51. Id. at 46-47.
52. Id. at 28.
53. Id. at 29-35.
54. Id. at 40.
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 44-55. The Court held that Texas had a legitimate state interest in maintaining each
school district's local control of public education. Id. at 49-53. Furthermore, the system of local
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The Court in Rodriguez, however, did make two critical suggestions that
have affected subsequent state court litigation in the area of public school fi-
nance. First, the Court suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment required
some level of adequate educational services.3 8 A federal equal protection at-
tack would be successful if a defined class could show that the state system
deprived them of an adequate education."' Thus, the Court recognized a dif-
ference between the right to an adequate education, and the right to the fund-
ing of that education. A state would violate the Equal Protection Clause where
it failed to provide an adequate educational opportunity to all students. A
state's public school finance system would violate the Equal Protection Clause
only if the system resulted in an inadequate educational opportunity for an
identifiable class of students. Second, the Court ruled that the importance of
education provided by the state did not determine whether the Court would
regard it as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 60 Instead, the critical inquiry was whether there was a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the
Court left the door open for state courts to use their state constitutions to
declare the right to an education a fundamental right since virtually all state
constitutions guarantee free public schools."'
Another Supreme Court case addressing the issue of a state's duty to pro-
property taxation for local educational expenditures rationally furthered the state's legitimate in-
terest in maintaining local control of public education. Id. at 54-55. In summary, the Court stated
that "to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal expenditures
between children who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say that such disparities
[in expenditures] are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidiously discrimina-
tory." Id.
58. Id. at 36-37. The Court stated:
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitu-
tionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [the rights to speak and
to vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in
Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument
might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an
interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels
are involved ....
Id.; see also Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub-
lic Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1084 (1989) (noting that the Court in Rodriguez required
the state to meet at least a minimal standard of educational adequacy).
59. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding a state law that withheld from local
school districts state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the
United States, and that authorized local school districts to deny enrollment to such children, vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
60. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34.
61. Id.
62. Every state except Mississippi has an education clause in its constitution requiring the state
to maintain a system of free public schools. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the
Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litiga-
tion, 19 J.L. & EDuc. 219, 229 (1990).
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vide an education is Plyler v. Doe.8s In Plyler, the Court reaffirmed its posi-
tion that the right to an education is not fundamental for purposes of equal
protection analysis. 6" Plyler did, however, elevate public education to the sta-
tus of a "quasi-fundamental" right.6" The Court reiterated that there is some
right to an 'equal educational opportunity' which, if denied by governmental
action, would merit heightened scrutiny.66 Thus, the Court applied intermedi-
ate judicial scrutiny, requiring an "important" state interest to be substan-
tially related to a process that plays a "fundamental role."6 Although the
Court acknowledged that improving the overall quality of education in the
state was an important state interest, the Court held that withholding public
funds from school districts that enrolled children of illegal aliens did not sub-
stantially further the state's interest.68 Consequently, the statute authorizing
the state to withhold the funds violated the Equal Protection Clause.69
In the subsequent case of Board of Education v. Rowley, 0 the Supreme
Court expounded on its ideal that there is some right to an "equal educational
opportunity." In Rowley, the Court identified a "basic floor of opportunity"
with respect to education that the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed."' It
found that the Equal Protection Clause required "[equal] access ... sufficient
to confer some educational benefit."'72 Moreover, in Papasan v. Allain,73 the
Court reiterated the idea of a minimal educational opportunity guaranteed by
the Equal Protection Clause, identifying a constitutionally protected "quantum
of education 74 to which all have an equal opportunity7 5
Rodriguez and subsequent decisions demonstrate the Court's distinct posi-
tion regarding public school finance systems. Education is clearly not a funda-
63. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, a Texas statute withheld state funds from local districts for
the education of children who were not legally admitted into the United States. Id. at 205.
64. Id. at 221 ("Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution.").
65. Id. at 221-23. The Court noted that education is not "merely some governmental 'benefit'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation .... (E]ducation has a fundamen-
tal role in maintaining the fabric of our society." Id. at 221.
66. Id. at 221-23.
67. Id. at 221; see also Biegel, supra note 58, at 1087 (discussing Plyler's framework for
heightened scrutiny).
68. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229.
69. Id.
70. 458 U.S. 176, 185 (1982). In Rowley, the parents of a handicapped child claimed that their
child was not provided a "free appropriate public education" pursuant to The Education of the
Handicapped Act because the state refused to provide funding for a sign-language interpreter in
the child's classes. Id.
71. Id. at 200.
72. Id.
73. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
74. Id. at 284.
75. In Papasan, a Mississippi statute provided that all funds derived from lands once held by
the Chickasaw Indian nation could only be expended for education of children in the school dis-
trict to which the lands belonged. Id. at 273. The Court applied only minimal scrutiny. Id. at 286.
The Court reasoned that only in the situation of a complete denial of educational opportunity to
one class would it apply heightened scrutiny. Id.
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mental right because it is not implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Fed-
eral Constitution." However, the Federal Equal Protection Clause requires
some level of "equal educational opportunity" 7 or a "basic floor of opportu-
nity"; 78 a school finance system must allow all students the opportunity to
obtain an adequate education.7 9 The Federal Equal Protection Clause man-
dates equal access to education.8 0 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause does not
embody a fundamental right to an education; but it does require states to pro-
vide funding for education at a level adequate to ensure an equal educational
opportunity for all students. Therefore, a class claiming denial of equal access
to education must show that factors other than individual merit affected its
access to an adequate education.8 1
Thus, Rodriguez did not close the door to federal equal protection chal-
lenges to state public school finance systems. In fact, Rodriguez and its prog-
eny permitted the development of a "quasi-fundamental" right at the federal
level and, perhaps more importantly, provided guidance for de novo litigation
at the state court level.
C. State Constitutions and Finance Systems
While a total deprivation of education would raise federal constitutional is-
sues, the Supreme Court's position on school finance leaves the issue of ine-
qualities among school districts largely to state law. In contrast to the Federal
Constitution, state constitutions have detailed provisions on education that ad-
dress the powers and duties of the state and localities in creating and running
school systems.82 A number of state courts have used the education clauses of
76. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-23; Rodriguez. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
77. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-23. The Court in Plyler articulated a right to educational advance-
ment based on individual merit. Id. at 222. The right to some level of educational opportunity is
not new to federal equal protection jurisprudence. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866,
876 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding a "right to a free and suitable publicly supported education"); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (finding a "right to direct the education of children
by selecting reputable teachers and places"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S 390, 399 (1923) (iden-
tifying a "right to acquire knowledge").
78. Rowley. 458 U.S. at 200.
79. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
80. See id. at 29-30 ("In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms."
(quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))).
81. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22.
82. See ALA. CO NST. art. 14, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIz. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; CoLo. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONsT.
art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONsT. art. VIII, § VII,
para. 1; HAwAII CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art X, § 1; IND.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. 9, 2d, § 3; KAN. CO NST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. Co NsT. § 183;
LA. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; ME. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; Mo. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1; MAss. CONST. Pt.
2, ch. 5, § 2; MiC. CoNST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, §
1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEa. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H.
CoNsT. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CoNsr. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI,
1991]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:195
their state constitutions to require more equal funding of schools throughout
the state.8 s
State court challenges to the validity of school district finance systems are
not new.8' Since the late 1960s, litigants who recognized that funding dispari-
ties existed between local school districts, and who believed it was wrong for
local property values to determine the quality of education, have challenged
the constitutionality of their states' public finance systems. 85 These challenges
generally have been of two types:86 (1) alleging that the finance system vio-
lated the state's equal protection clause (or if the state did not have an equal
protection clause, the state's equality guarantee provision); 7 or (2) alleging
§ 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST.
art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C.
CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CON T. ch.2, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST.
art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see
also Thro, supra note 62, at 229 n.48.
83. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elem. Sch.
Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Kirby v. Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71
(Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
84. See Thro, supra note 62, at 219-20.
85. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz.
1973); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d
1241 (Cal. 1971); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thomp-
son v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (I1.
1976); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich.
1973); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990), modifying 769 P.2d
684 (Mont. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439
N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390
N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen
v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County
v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
86. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 373 (N.J. 1990) ("[The resolution of cases litigating
the constitutionality of the state school finance system] has depended on the court's interpretation
of the state's constitutional education provision and/or the state's equal protection doctrine.").
87. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV.
1195, 1219-21 (1985); see also Thro, supra note 62, at 228-32 (noting three methods of analysis
courts use for state equal protection clauses and equality guarantee clauses). Some courts strictly
adhere to federal equal protection analysis. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga.
1981) (strictly adhering to federal equal protection analysis in a school finance reform context).
Other state courts remain within the federal levels-of-scrutiny framework, but have their own
independent criteria as to what rights are fundamental and what classes are suspect. See, e.g.,
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977) (applying federal equal protection analysis, but find-
ing education a fundamental right and wealth a suspect class). Finally, some state courts totally
reject the federal framework and analysis and develop instead their own independent frameworks
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that the system violated the state constitution's education clause.88
The state equal protection clause argument has not been an effective tool for
school district finance reform.89 Consequently, most recent litigation has fo-
cused on the education clause alone as a basis to effectuate school finance
reform.90
1. General Characteristics of State Constitutional Education Clauses
The obligation that the education clause imposes on the state government
will determine whether a challenge to the public school finance system based
on the education clause can succeed. Generally, a court will hold that an edu-
cation clause mandates school finance reform if: (1) the education clause im-
poses an obligation on the legislature; (2) funding disparities exist between
school districts in the state; and (3) the existence of the funding disparities
indicates that the legislature has not met the obligations that the education
clause has imposed upon it. 9'
Scholars have divided the forty-nine state education clauses into four dis-
tinct categories based on the level of obligation imposed on the state legisla-
ture. 92 Category I includes fifteen states that simply mandate a free system of
public schools.93 Category II contains nineteen states9" that require the public
school systems to reach some minimum level of quality-usually "thorough
and/or efficient." 98 Category III consists of eight states9" that have a "stronger
and analyses to deal with equal protection claims. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273
(N.J. 1973) (holding that the state equal protection clause may be more restrictive than the Fed-
eral Equal Protection Clause).
88. See Thro, supra note 62, at 228-32.
89. Id. at 231 n.56 (stating that only five cases effectuated school finance reform using state
equal protection clauses or equality guarantees and that nine cases rejected challenges based upon
state equal protection clauses or equality guarantees).
90. Id. at 239-41.
91. See id. at 229.
92. See Block Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66-70 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814-16 nn.143-46
(1985); Thro, supra note 62, at 243-49.
93. See Ratner, supra note 92, at 814 n.143 (noting that Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Utah, and Vermont have Category I clauses); see also CONN. CO ST. art. VIII, § I
("There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state.") Ratner,
supra note 92, at 815 ("Provisions in [Category I] contain only general education language and
are exemplified by the Connecticut Constitution.");.
94. See Ratner, supra note 92, at 815 n.144 (noting that Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin all have Category II edu-
cation clauses).
95. See Thro, supra note 62, at 244. New Jersey's constitution exemplifies a Category II
clause: "The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of
five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; see also Ratner, supra note 92, at 815 ("Pro-
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and more specific educational mandate."9 Finally, states with Category IV
clauses make education the most important state duty.98 Of course, whether a
state's school finance system violates any one of these types of clauses depends
to a great extent on the public school finance system in place.
2. State Public School Finance Systems
State legislatures and local school districts have shared the responsibility for
financing public education since the early twentieth century." States began to
receive federal aid to help finance public education when the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act100 was enacted into law in 1965. However, the vast
majority of funding for public education comes from state aid and local
revenues.
101
In general, most states and local school districts fund public education from
a combination of the state common school fund and local revenues. 10 2 The
legislature appropriates a certain amount of state revenues for the common
school fund.10 The local school districts supplement the state aid by raising
visions in [Category II] emphasize the quality of public education.").
96. See Ratner, supra note 92, at 815-16 n.144. (noting that California, Indiana, Iowa, Mas-
sachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wyoming all have Category III clauses).
97. Id. at 814-15. ("Provisions in [Category III] contain a stronger and more specific educa-
tion mandate than those in the first and second groups."). Rhode Island's constitution is typical of
a Category III clause: "[The legislature is required] to promote public schools ... and to adopt all
means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure ... the advantages ... of education
. .R.I. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1.
98. See Ratner, supra note 92, at 816. Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New
Hampshire, and Washington all have Category IV education clauses. Id. at 816 n.145. Washing-
ton's constitution is an example of a Category IV clause: "It is the paramount duty of the State to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders .... WASH.
CoN sT. art. IX, § 1; see also Ratner, supra note 92, at 816 ("[P]rovisions in [Category IV]
mandate the strongest commitment to education."). The education clause in the 1970 Illinois Con-
stitution is a Category IV clause. Id. at 816 n.146.
99. See Annette B. Johnson, State Court Intervention in School Finance Reform, 28 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 325, 328 (1979).
100. 20 U.S.C. §§ 821-900 (current version at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-3386 (1990 & Supp.
1991)). The Act reads in part:
In recognition of-(l) the special educational needs of children of low-income fami-
lies and the impact of concentrations of low-income families on the ability of local
educational agencies to provide educational programs which meet such needs .... the
Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States to-(A) provide financial
assistance to State and local educational agencies to meet the special needs of such
educationally deprived children at the preschool, elementary, and secondary levels...
20 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a).
101. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 387 (N.J. 1990) (stating that nationwide, federal aid
comprises about eight percent of the budget of school districts.).





revenue for education primarily from local property taxes. 104 Generally, all
districts must levy a minimum tax rate to raise local revenues for education. 10 5
However, local voters may approve an increase in the tax rate to a statutory
maximum. 106
School district finance systems fit into three general categories: (1) flat
grant systems; (2) foundation programs; and (3) percentage equalizing or dis-
trict power equalizing plans. 0 7 Illinois law makes use of all three categories of
finance systems. s08 It is necessary to briefly describe each category in order to
fully understand the source of funding disparities between school districts.
a. Flat grant systems
Under a flat grant system, the state distributes state aid for education to
school districts on a per-pupil or a per-teacher basis. 109 Thus, the amount of
money that the state distributes for education does not depend on each dis-
trict's own ability to raise local funds for education. "' The underlying as-
sumption behind this system is that each school district can locally raise suffi-
cient funds to supplement the state aid and can thus provide a sufficient
education."' Such a system does not contemplate equality in funds for educa-
tion between school districts in the state." 2 There may be great disparities in
funds available for education between any two school districts." 3 One district
may be able to raise much more local revenue for education than the other
because it is able to tax its property at a higher rate, and/or property within
its boundaries has a much higher assessed valuation." 4
b. Foundation program systems
An alternative finance system-the foundation school finance system-is
characterized by the Strayer-Haig" 5 foundation program." 6 Strayer-Haig es-
tablishes a minimum dollar amount per-pupil that is necessary to fund an edu-
104. Cf. id. at 838 (stating that in Illinois, over 90% of local tax revenue is raised through the
real estate property tax).
105. Id. at 839.
106. Id.
107. See Johnson, supra note 99, at 328-30.
108. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 18-8 (1989).




113. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (holding unconstitutional under
the Connecticut Constitution the state's flat-aid school financing system because it resulted in
great disparity in per-pupil funding between school districts).
114. Id. at 365-68.
115. George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig developed the formula to mathematically express
a state government's policy as to its distribution of aid to school districts. Schwartz, supra note
102, at 835. Illinois adopted the formula in 1927. Id.
116. Johnson, supra note 99, at 328-29; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 835-37.
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cation that meets state constitutional standards.11 7 The state specifies a qualifi-
cation rate at which each district must tax itself in order to receive state
funding. " 8 Using the specified qualification tax rate, some districts raise local
funds for education at a level lower than the foundation level.119 The state
guarantees an amount of state aid for education for these districts that will
bring their per-pupil expenditures to the foundation level. 20
Thus, the foundation program is an improvement over a simple flat grant
system because the foundation program accounts for disparities between
school districts in educational funding per pupil. 21 It does, however, have at
least two shortcomings. 22 First, it does not create an incentive for school dis-
tricts to tax themselves at a rate over and above the qualification rate.122 Sec-
ond, it does not compensate for the fact that, even if a property-wealthy dis-
trict 1 2' and a property-poor district1 25 tax at the same rate, the property-
wealthy district can raise much more local money for education than can the
property-poor district. "
c. Equalization systems
A third finance system, the equalization or district power equalizing system,
attempts to remedy the foundation system's shortcomings, while also attempt-
ing to preserve local control of education. 27 The system attempts to equalize
the property bases that districts use to raise local revenue for education.128 The
state uses an equalization formula that guarantees the same amount of fund-
ing (state and local funding combined) for education to districts that tax
themselves at the same rate."' Thus, if both a property-wealthy school district
and a property-poor school district tax themselves at the same rate, the poor
school district can have the same amount of money available to it to spend on
each pupil's education as the wealthy district has available to it to spend on
each pupil's education.' The state does not consider the amount of money a
school district raises through local taxation.2
Although the equalization system decreases disparities in funding for educa-
tion between property-wealthy school districts and property-poor school dis-
117. Johnson, supra note 99, at 329; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 835.
118. Johnson, supra note 99, at 329; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 835.
119. Johnson, supra note 99, at 329; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 835.
120. Johnson, supra note 99, at 329; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 836.
121. Johnson, supra note 99, at 329.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. A property-wealthy district is a school district with a relatively high assessed valuation.
125. A property-poor district is a school district with a relatively low assessed valuation.
126. Johnson, supra note 99, at 329.
127. Id. at 329-30; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 837.
128. Johnson, supra note 99, at 329-30; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 837.




tricts, the system has two critical flaws.1 32 First, states place a limitation on
the local tax rate that it will equalize."3 ' For instance, a state may guarantee
$2000 per pupil to spend on education to every district that taxes itself at a set
rate. However, if a district taxes above that set rate, the state will not equalize
the revenues raised by the higher tax rate.134 The set tax rate becomes a ceil-
ing above which the state will not equalize.133 Consequently, a poorer school
district that cannot afford to tax at a higher rate is limited to $2000 per pupil
while wealthier school districts that can afford to tax at a higher rate are
guaranteed $2000 per pupil, plus any "additional funds" they raise from local
property taxes. The state does not equalize these "additional funds."13s Sec-
ond, the amount of money a given school district spends on education is depen-
dent upon the tax levies voted upon by district voters. 13 7 Thus, the quality of
education each district can afford to provide for its students is dependent upon
the value residents of each district place on education. 3 ' Neither the limita-
tion placed upon the local tax rate nor the variable tax levies voted upon by
each district's voters is necessarily related to a student's educational needs.10
D. Recent State Court Litigation
Recent litigation at the state court level has focused essentially on the same
basic issue: the appropriateness of "an educational funding system that de-
pends on a combination of state and local taxes producing disparity of expend-
itures in the face of inverse disparity of need. '"140 While each state court deci-
sion is not binding precedent in other state court jurisdictions, the different
decisions influence courts in other states.
1. The New Jersey Approach: Abbott v. Burke
In Abbott v. Burke,"" the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of the state's public school finance system. The New Jersey Consti-
tution contained a Category II education clause. 14 This clause required the
legislature to provide a "thorough and efficient system of free public









140. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 373 (N.J. 1990).
141. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
142. See Ratner, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
143. N.J. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1 ("The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance
and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the
children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.").
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equalizing system that guaranteed a tax base per pupil for each district taxing
itself at a certain rate."" Despite the equalization of state aid,' 5 the disparity
in spending per pupil between the wealthiest school districts and the poorest
school districts was $1135 in 1984-85.148 In Abbott v. Burke, the petitioners
based their challenge on the state constitution's education clause,"47 and equal
protection clause, 48 and claimed that the finance system violated the Law
Against Discrimination.149 The New Jersey Supreme Court based its decision
solely upon the education clause.'8 0 It held that New Jersey's school finance
system violated the "thorough and efficient" clause due to funding disparities
between the poorest and wealthiest school districts.15' However, it found no
such violation across the board-between all school districts in the state. 52
The court first defined "thorough and efficient" as the minimal standard
required by the state constitution.158 It acknowledged that the scope and con-
tent of "thorough and efficient" had to be flexible and wide in scope. 54 With
that in mind, the court defined a "thorough and efficient" education as one
that allowed "disadvantaged children ... to compete in, and contribute to, the
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to 18A:7A-52 (West 1975); see also Abbott, 575 A.2d at
378 ("In the School budget year 1985-86, the GTB [Guaranteed Tax Base] was $250,927.").
145. Equalization aid totalled $1.34 billion in 1985-86. Two-thirds of New Jersey's school dis-
tricts received equalization aid in 1985-86. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 378.
146. Id. at 383.
147. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
148. N.J. CONST. art. I, § I ("All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness.").
149. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991).
150. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 410. The court stated:
We decline to rule on plaintiffs' state equal protection claim. . . .We referred in
Robinson I to the monumental governmental upheaval that would result if the equal
protection doctrine were held applicable to the financing of education and similarly
applied to all governmental services. We need not deal with those implications, for the
remedy afforded in this opinion, although not based on equal protection, substantially
mitigates plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
Id. (citations omitted).
151. The court defined "richer ... districts" as "those suburban districts whose indicators of
wealth-per capita income, property values, and socioeconomic status-are the highest." Id. at
382. The court defined "poorer ... districts" as school districts in "urban areas with the highest
poverty indicators and the lowest socioeconomic status." Id.
152. Id. at 383.
153. Id. at 368-69.
154. Id. at 367. The court stated:
[Wlhat a thorough and efficient education consists of is a continually changing con-
cept. . . . [T]he definition of a thorough and efficient system of education and the
delineation of all the factors necessary to be included therein, depend upon the eco-
nomic, historical, social and cultural context in which that education is delivered. ...
[W]hat seems sufficient today may be proved inadequate tomorrow, and even more
importantly that only in the light of experience can one ever come to know whether a
particular program is achieving the desired end.
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society entered by the relatively advantaged children."'I5 A "thorough and
efficient" education would equip the student for his role as a citizen and com-
petitor in the labor market and would allow the student to compete with rela-
tively advantaged students in the labor market. 1'" The court recognized not
only that "the State ... [has] the power to spend in excess of the norm in view
of the presumed greater needs of ... [disadvantaged] students, but [also] that
it might be required to do so."'"
Armed with its definition of a "thorough and efficient" education, the court
found that the existing finance system could not realistically meet the "thor-
ough and efficient" standard.'" The court reasoned that the critical fault in
the system lay in reliance on local property taxation.'5 9 While the finance sys-
tem allowed each school district to raise all the money necessary to provide its
students with a thorough and efficient education, many districts were simply
too poor to raise the money they theoretically were empowered to raise. The
state could not sufficiently supplement the money raised by the property-poor
school districts. Thus, the court noted that a "thorough and efficient" system
of schools could not realistically be met by reliance on local taxation.160 "The
discordant correlations between the educational needs of the school districts
and their respective tax bases" suggested that any such effort would likely
fail.'' The court further reasoned that the system created a situation where
"the poorer the district, and the greater the need, the less money available and
the worse the education." '62
The court noted that the finance system fell short of the constitutional stan-
dard in two ways. First, the disparity in expenditures for education between
affluent school districts and poor school districts caused students in the poor
school districts to receive less than a "thorough and efficient" education-one
that would allow them to compete with relatively advantaged students in the
155. Id. at 372 (citing Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985)).
156. Id. at 368-69. The court used several different means to describe a "thorough and effi-
cient" education throughout the opinion. For example, later in the opinion, the court interpreted a
"thorough and efficient" education to mean "being able to fulfill one's role as a citizen .... the
ability to participate fully in society, in the life of one's community, the ability to appreciate
music, art, and literature, and the ability to share all of that with friends." Id. at 397.
157. Id. at 371.
158. Id. at 376, 384.
159. Id. at 384.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973)). -
162. Id. at 387. The court recognized "municipal overburden" as a bar to increased funding for
education at the local level in poorer urban districts. It noted that "'municipal overburden' is the
excessive tax levy some municipalities must impose to meet governmental needs other than educa-
tion." Poorer urban districts must use tax money derived from their relatively low property values
to satisfy costs for "police and fire protection, road maintenance, social services, water, sewer,
garbage disposal, and other similar services." Consequently, poorer urban districts have a local tax
levy well above the average rate, and school boards in poor urban districts are hesitant to raise tax
rates to add more funding for education. Id. at 393-94.
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labor market.' Second, the system provided students in poorer urban school
districts with an inadequate absolute level of education. 6 ' The court further
found, however, that only the combined effects of these two shortcomings vio-
lated New Jersey's education clause.16 5 Consequently, the court concluded that
the existing system-which did not alleviate disparity in available funding for
education, and which did not provide poor school districts with sufficient fund-
ing to educate their disadvantaged students,"' could not provide a "thorough
and efficient" education. 67 Therefore, the system violated the New Jersey
Constitution.
Critical to its decision was the court's finding that the needs of students in
poor urban areas differed from and vastly exceeded those of students in prop-
erty-wealthy areas." 8 Consequently, the court required the state to implement
a "significantly different approach to education"'69 in poor urban areas. The
state had to assure enough funding for poorer districts to provide more than a
163. Id. at 382-89.
164. Id. at 394-403. The court identified several shortcomings of the education in poor urban
school districts: limited exposure to computers, inadequate physical facilities, limited or no expo-
sure to foreign languages, and limited exposure to music and art. Id. at 394-97. By an inadequate
"absolute" level of education, the court meant that students in poor urban areas were receiving an
education that was not only insufficient as compared to wealthier school districts, but also inade-
quate in and of itself. Id. at 394-403.
165. Id. at 399-400.
166. Cf Johnson, supra note 99, at 330 (discussing the characteristics of equalization systems).
An equalization program does not attempt to alleviate disparities in funding between school dis-
tricts. It simply attempts to alleviate the differences in local effort by equalizing tax bases between
school districts. Wealthier school districts can still raise much more funding for education than
can poorer school districts because: (1) wealthier school districts generally have tax bases much
higher than the guaranteed tax base under the finance system; and (2) taxpayers in wealthier
school districts can afford to pay higher taxes for education. Id.
167. Abbott, 495 A.2d at 384. The court later summarized:
Disparity of funding, its relationship to poverty, the critical needs-educational and
otherwise--of [poor urban district] pupils, the practicability to raise further funds
through taxation (municipal overburden), the likelihood of the permanence of these
factors, the level of substantive education actually being given, the failure rate of
[poor urban] students, their dropout rate, were all sufficiently shown, and dramati-
cally contrasted with the situation of students in richer districts.
Id. at 388-89.
168. Id. at 319, 340, 344, 371-81, 385. The court noted the many special needs that poorer
urban students require:
Many students in poorer urban districts do not have books at home. These students
obviously need adequate libraries and media centers. . . . [C]ounseling services
[could] help children overcome problems associated with unwanted pregnancies,
drugs, crime, or unsupportive families; ... both crisis counselors and career counsel-
ors from elementary school through high school may be needed to assist students to
overcome obstacles and receive a worthwhile education.
Alternative education programs for students identified as potential dropouts are
suggested as necessary to motivate a substantial number of students in poorer urban
districts.
Id. at 402.
169. Id. at 401.
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basic education.170
Importantly, the court noted that its decision did not require total equality
in funding for education between all school districts.171 The court's decision
required equalization aid only to a certain level-that level necessary to
achieve a thorough and efficient education.172 School districts could exceed the
thorough and efficient level.178 However, the court did not foreclose the possi-
bility that "changing circumstances, including future development of educa-
tion in this state, [could] lead to an interpretation of the constitutional obliga-
tion as requiring . . . equality of funding. 17'
Finally, the court instructed the legislature on the constitutional require-
ments of any public school finance system.'75 Any new legislation had to as-
sure that the educational funding of poorer urban districts was substantially
equal to that of property-rich districts.' 7  The court required funding to be
certain each year. 77 The court mandated that the state assure funding per
pupil at a level that was "substantially equivalent" to that spent in those dis-
tricts providing the kind of education that poor urban students needed; the
funding could not depend on the budgeting and taxing decisions of local school
boards.178 Therefore, the legislature was to implement a new public school fi-
nance mechanism. However, the amount of available funding could not depend
on how much a poorer urban school district was willing to tax. 179 The legisla-
tive remedy had to assure that the poorer urban districts had a budget per
pupil that was approximately equal to the average of the wealthier suburban
districts; and additionally, that budget had to be sufficient to address the
poorer students' "special needs." 80
2. The Texas Approach: Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
Another recent state court decision that found a violation of a state educa-
tion clause is Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby. 8' In Kirby, the
Texas Supreme Court declared that the state's public school finance system' 82
170. Id. ("Something quite different is needed, something that deals not only with reading,
writing, and arithmetic, but with the environment that shapes these students' lives and determines
their educational needs.").




175. Id. at 408-10. The court also noted, "[G]iven the limitation of judicial power, we recog-
nize that the kind of equity that can be done in this area by the Legislature cannot be accom-
plished by judicial order." .1d. at 409.
176. Id. at 408.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 409.
180. ld.
181. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
182. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.002 to 16.008 (West 1987).
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violated the Texas Constitution's education clause.18 The Texas Constitution
included a Category II education clause. 184 It required the legislature to pro-
vide an "efficient system" of public free schools.' 85
Texas' public school finance system was a foundation type' 86 that attempted
to provide students in all school districts with "at least a basic education.' 87
The state aid given to each school district was equalized so that low property-
wealth districts received more state aid than high property-wealth districts. 188
Despite the state aid system, and due to a property wealth disparity of 700-to-
1 between the wealthiest school district and the poorest school district,'89 per-
pupil expenditures varied from $2112 to $19,333.190
The court recognized that the Texas Constitution's education clause im-
posed an affirmative duty to provide an "efficient" system of public schools. 191
The court then directed its attention toward defining the word "efficient" in
the education clause by ascertaining what the framers of the clause intended
when they drafted it.' 3 The court noted that those who drafted and ratified
the education clause "never contemplated the possibility that such gross ine-
qualities could exist within an 'efficient' system."' 93 Furthermore, the court
emphasized that the constitutional delegates realized the importance of provid-
ing an education for both rich and poor citizens.' 9' Thus, the court reasoned
that the constitutional framers and ratifiers did not intend to sanction a public
school finance system that produced such vast disparities between school dis-
tricts. 1" Instead, the court determined that the framers and ratifiers intended
183. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § i.
184. Ratner, supra note 92, at 815.
185. TEx. Co NsT. art. VII, § 1 ("A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preser-
vation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State
to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools.").
186. See Johnson, supra note 99, at 333 (describing the characteristics of foundation finance
systems).
187. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.002 to 16.008; Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
188. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
189. Id.
190. Id. Also, an average of $2000 more per pupil was spent on each of the 150,000 students in
the wealthiest districts than was spent on the 150,000 students in the poorest districts. Id. at 392-
93.
191. Id. at 394. The court also rejected the state's argument that interpretation of the educa-
tion clause was a "political question" for the legislature to decide. Id. The court stated:
[T]he function of the judiciary in deciding constitutional questions is not one which it
is at liberty to decline .... [We] cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure
because it approaches the confines of the constitution; [we] cannot pass it by because
it is doubtful; with whatever doubt, with whatever difficulties a case may be attended,
[we] must decide it, when it arises in judgment.
Id. (quoting Morton v. Gordon, Dallam 396, 397-98 (Tex. 1841)).
192. Id. at 394-97; see also Thro, supra note 62, at 237 n.98 (stating that the Texas Supreme
Court's standard method of state constitutional interpretation is use of the framers' intent).
193. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 395.
194. Id. at 395.
195. Id. at 396.
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a system that would provide a "general diffusion of knowledge." 1" Since the
public school finance system "provide[d] not for a diffusion that [was] general,
but for one that [was] limited and unbalanced,"' 197 the court concluded that
the system was "directly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency."' 198
After so holding, the court set out the characteristics of a finance system
that would meet the education clause's "efficiency" mandate."' Efficiency re-
quired a direct correlation between each school district's tax effort and the
educational resources available to it. 20 0 The court insisted that school districts
enjoy "substantially equal access to similar revenues per-pupil at similar levels
of tax effort." 0' 1 Furthermore, the court mandated that the public school fi-
nance system provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide. 20 2 The
finance system could account for differing costs between school districts, or
costs associated with providing an equalized educational opportunity to atypi-
cal or disadvantaged students.2 0 3 However, although local districts could sup-
plement the efficient system provided by the legislature, any local enrichment
could derive only from local tax effort.
20 4
3. The Wisconsin Approach: Kukor v. Grover
Unlike the courts in Abbott v. Burke and Edgewood Independent School
District v. Kirby, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kukor v. Grover 05 upheld
Wisconsin's public school finance system206 against a constitutional attack.
Wisconsin's constitution contained a Category II education clause:20 7 it re-
quired the legislature to provide public schools that were "as nearly uniform as
practicable."20 8 Wisconsin used a district power equalizing system that equal-




199. Id. at 397-99. The court noted its limitations in the area of public school finance:
Although we have ruled the school financing system to be unconstitutional, we do not
now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the legislation it should enact; nor do
we order it to raise taxes. The legislature has primary responsibility to decide how
best to achieve an efficient system. We decide only the nature of the constitutional
mandate and whether that mandate has been met.
Id. at 399.
200. Id. at 397.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 398.
204. Id.
205. 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
206. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 121.004 to 121.007 (West 1988).
207. Ratner, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
208. WIs. CoNsT. art. X, § 3 ("The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of
district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and
without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.").
209. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 571-73.
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system equalized school district tax bases that fell below the guaranteed tax
base level. 210 The petitioners claimed that the system violated both the state
education clause and the state equal protection clause. 21' They claimed that
the system violated the state constitution because it "fail[ed] to take into ac-
count the fact that children have differing educational needs, some of which
may, as a result of socioeconomic factors, require greater financial resources to
achieve the same level of educational opportunity. 2 12 The petitioners further
claimed that the system failed to address the fact "that those districts with the
greatest educational burden are the least capable of raising sufficient financing
from property taxation as a result of lower property valuations or 'municipal
overburden.' ",213 The petitioners' claim did not focus on disparity in per-pupil
expenditures. Instead, their claim focused on the perceived inability of poorer
school districts to raise enough funding to meet the special needs of disadvan-
taged students.
The court first considered whether the finance system violated the education
clause. 1' Accordingly, it sought to define the phrase "nearly uniform as prac-
ticable. ' 21 5 In interpreting the clause, the court used the plain meaning of the
words in the context of the constitution, the historical analysis of the constitu-
tional debates, and early interpretations of the clause.21 6 The court acknowl-
edged that it could not define the clause solely from the plain meaning of its
words.21 7 Furthermore, judicial precedent was unavailable since the Wisconsin
courts had not previously decided whether the education clause required the
state to allocate resources so as to guarantee that each district could respond
to the particularized needs of each student. 218
210. See Johnson, supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing the characteristics of
equalization school finance systems). The system guarantees a property tax base at which partici-
pating districts can tax themselves. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 121.01 (West 1988). The guaranteed tax
base in 1985-86 was $270,100 per pupil. Kukor. 436 N.W.2d at 571. If a school district's actual
tax base falls below the guaranteed tax base, the state aid formula supplements the actual tax
base so that it will reach the guaranteed level. Id. The amount of state aid Wisconsin will grant
each district is subject to two "shared cost" ceilings determined by the legislature. Id. The pri-
mary shared cost is the amount of a district's costs that is less than the primary ceiling, and the
secondary shared cost is the amount that exceeds the ceiling. Id. The state guarantees less aid to
equalize a district's secondary shared cost than it guarantees a district's primary shared cost. Id.
at 571-72. Thus, a district whose actual tax base is greater than the guaranteed tax base receives
no equalization aid; a district whose actual tax base is 37 % of the guaranteed tax base pays 37 %
of the costs that do not exceed the primary ceiling; and districts must pay for a proportionally
greater amount of costs that exceed the primary ceiling. Id. at 572.
211. WIs. CONsT. art. I, § I ("All people are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these
rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.").
212. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 573.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 574-78.
215. Id. at 574-76.
216. Id. at 574.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 575.
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With those findings in mind, the court focused on the constitutional debates
and found that the framers intended "uniformity" to apply to the character of
instruction given in public schools-to the substantive curriculum offered in
public schools.219 According to the court, "uniformity" did not apply to the
revenue raising powers of the school districts.2 0 Thus, the court rejected an
interpretation of the clause that would have required absolute uniformity in
education, although it conceded such an interpretation could be socially
desirable.22" '
Finally, the court adopted an interpretation of the phrase "nearly uniform
as practicable." '222 The court held this phrase did not mandate uniformity in
educational opportunities.22  The phrase assured that state funds were distrib-
uted on an equal per-pupil basis so that the "character" of instruction was as
uniform as practicable. 22 ' However, it did not require the state to meet the
special needs of students in property-poor school districts.225 Applying its in-
terpretation to Wisconsin's school funding system, the court found that the
system was actually "more responsive to wealth disparities than the constitu-
tional provision for the school fund" since the system provided equalization
funds for poorer school districts. 2 6
Unlike the Abbott and Kirby courts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ad-
dressed the petitioners' state equal protection claim.227 After describing the
levels of scrutiny framework it would apply, 228 the court declared that "'equal
opportunity for education' . . . as defined by art. X, sec. 3 [Wisconsin's 'uni-
form education' clause], is a fundamental right. ' 229 The court, however, did
not apply strict judicial scrutiny. The court reasoned that since the "uniform
education" clause did not mandate absolute equality in districts' per-pupil ex-
penditares, but only that the state distribute state funds on an equal per-pupil
basis, and since petitioners did not claim that the state had distributed aid on
an unequal basis, no fundamental right was implicated.22 0 Consequently, the
court applied only minimal judicial scrutiny and upheld the constitutionality of
219. Id. (noting that the framers "were concerned ... with the character of instruction that
should be given in ... schools after the districts were formed").
220. Id.
221. Id. ("Whether absolute uniformity of an equal opportunity for education in all school
districts of the state is socially desirable, is not for this court to decide. We can only conclude that
the plain meaning nf sec. 3, art. X does not mandate it.").
222. Id. at 577-78.
223. Id. at 577.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 585.
226. Id. at 577.
227. WIs. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
228. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 579. The framework the court used was the same as federal equal
protection analysis: "Unless a statute may be said to affect a 'fundamental right' or to create a
classification based on a 'suspect' criterion, the standard this court uses in reviewing the constitu-






An Illinois court faced with a challenge to the public school finance system
can thus consider two recent decisions that struck down school finance systems
in other states, and one that upheld a finance system. However, although the
courts in New Jersey and Texas have found their public school finance systems
unconstitutional, Illinois courts have refused to do so.
E. Illinois
1. The Illinois Public School Finance System
The Illinois public school finance system combines three sources of revenue
to fund public education: the Federal Government, the state government, and
revenues generated from local property taxes.2"2 Revenues generated from lo-
cal property taxes are the primary source of funding for public education. 23 3
Consequently, it is not surprising that disparities in per-pupil spending for ed-
ucation exist between school districts with high property wealth and school
districts with low property wealth.
There is a wide variation in property wealth per pupil between the 967 pub-
lic school districts in Illinois.234 This variation is quite significant since fifty-
four percent of Illinois school district receipts come from local property
taxes.211 In 1989-90, the measured property wealth per pupil in Illinois ranged
from a low of $5272 for the poorest district to a high of more than $1.3 mil-
lion in the wealthiest district. 236
Most important to an attack on the public school finance system in Illinois is
that, despite alternative state aid schemes, expenditures for education per pu-
pil vary substantially. In fiscal year 1988, per-pupil expenditures ranged from
approximately $12,900 to less than $2l100. 3 7 Consequently, on November 13,
231. Id. at 580-82. Under minimal scrutiny, the court found a legitimate state interest in pre-
serving local control of education. Id. at 580-81. The system, despite its discriminatory impact,
was rationally related to preserving local control of education since "[nlo scheme of taxation...
has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact." Id. at 582. The Wisconsin court
was careful to point out that its analysis of the appropriate standard of review differed only con-
ceptually from the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Rodriguez although the Wisconsin
court found equal opportunity for education a fundamental right. Id. at 579-80. The court rea-
soned that its analysis was consistent with Rodriguez: in both cases the courts applied only mini-
mal scrutiny because the issue before each court was the constitutionality of spending disparities,
rather than a complete denial of education. Id. at 580.
232. See Schwartz, supra note 102, at 832-39.
233. G. Alfred Hess & James E. Ward, Financing Public Education For Illinois' Future 20
(Apr. 8, 1987) (unpublished report, on file with the DePaul Law Review).
234. See Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7, at 20.
235. See THOMAS L. BURROUGHS & ROBERT LEININGER, ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF EDUC., PER-
FORMANCE PROFILES: ILLINOIS SCHOOLS REPORT TO THE PUBLIC 19 (May 1990); Fairness in
Funding Illinois Schools, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 1990, § 1, at 10.
236. Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7, at 20.
237. Id. at 144. Comparisons between wealthy school districts and poor school districts in Illi-
nois indicate that the quality of education in poor school districts suffers because of such great
disparities in spending per student. In 1989, students in wealthy districts had much higher scores
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1990, the Committee for Educational Rights, made up of fifty-five Illinois
public school districts and a number of school children and their parents, filed
a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County against then-Governor James
R. Thompson, State Superintendent of Education Robert Leininger, and the
state Board of Education. 8 Plaintiffs are alleging that the Illinois school fi-
nance system"3 9 fails to provide certain children with an efficient system of
high quality public schools."" Importantly, plaintiffs allege that the finance
system allows a discriminatory distribution of educational resources that re-
sults in greatly varied educational opportunities. 4 Thus, the crux of this at-
tack, and of any such attack on the school finance system, is the source of the
disparity in per-pupil expenditures between school districts. It is necessary to
briefly consider the different methods used to fund public education in Illinois
in order to understand the source of such disparity in per-pupil expenditures.
The Federal Government grants aid to education in the form of categorical
aid, or a legislative appropriation to fund only certain federal programs.2 42
Thus, these programs restrict a school district in its use of the federal funds.243
The State of Illinois provides substantial aid to help fund public schools.244
The complex state funding formula provides three alternative methods of allo-
cating state funds for education. 245 The three alternative methods of allocation
are the special equalization computation, the alternate method computation,
and the flat grant computation.248 The method by which a school district re-
in the Illinois Goal Assessment Program Reading and Mathematics Test. BURROUGHS & LEIN-
INGER, supra note 235, at 12-13. Students in wealthy school districts had higher ACT scores than
students in poorer school districts. Id. at 14 (stating that the average composite score for wealthy
districts was 19.9, and for poor districts, 18.2). Wealthier school districts employed a higher per-
centage of teachers with advanced degrees than poorer districts. Id. at 16. Finally, wealthier dis-
tricts paid their teachers significantly higher salaries than poorer school districts paid their teach-
ers. Id. at 17.
238. Plaintiffs filed the case on the first day of National Education Week. Plaintiffs allege that
the statutory scheme of school finance in Illinois violates three provisions of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution: (1) the education article, ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; (2) the equal protection clause,
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2; and (3) the "no special law" clause, ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. Complaint
of Petitioner, Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, No. 90 CH-1 1097 (Cir. Ct. of Cook
County, filed Nov. 13, 1990).
239. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, paras. 1-36 (1989).
240. See ILL. CoNsT. art. X, § I ("The State shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services.").
241. Complaint of Petitioner at 4.
242. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 833. Categorical aid is funding that the federal government
supplies for financing only specific programs such as food services, vocational education, the Emer-
gency School Assistance Act, and special education. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 833-34. The Illinois Constitution requires the state to contribute funds to support
public education. ILL. CoNsT. art. X, § 1.
245. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 18-8 (1989); see also Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7,
at 19-20.
246. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 18-8 (1989); see also Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7,
at 22-25; supra notes 109-39 and accompanying text (describing in detail the flat grant systems,
foundation systems, and equalization systems).
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ceives state funding depends primarily upon the equalized assessed valuation
of property within the district.2 47 All three methods embody the foundation
level-a dollar input per "chapter one weighted average daily attendance stu-
dent" ("CWADA") 248-that represents the guaranteed per-pupil, minimum
level of state financial support.24 9 The state will guarantee the per-pupil foun-
dation level in combined state and local funding.250
The special equalization formula was used by 752 of the 967 Illinois school
districts in 1989-90.251 Basically, the special equalization formula guarantees a
property tax base per CWADA student. 252 It then provides state funding for
the difference between the revenues theoretically generated by the guaranteed
tax base per CWADA student, and the revenues generated from the actual
equalized assessed valuation per CWADA student.253 Consequently, a school
district with high per-pupil property wealth will receive less state aid per pupil
than a school district with a lower per-pupil property wealth. 254 The poorest
school districts use this method to receive state aid. 255
Districts with relatively high actual wealth per CWADA student use the
alternate method computation to receive state aid for education.2 56 In 1989-90,
149 Illinois school districts used this formula to receive their state aid.25 7 The
alternate method formula guarantees less state funding for education to school
districts which use it.258
Districts with the highest equalized assessments per CWADA student use
the flat grant computation to receive state aid for education. 259 Under this
formula, each school district receives a grant per CWADA student equal to
seven percent of the foundation level.2 10
Public school funding is not limited to state aid; local districts also have an
247. See Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7, at 19-20.
248. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 para. 18-8 (1989); see also Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7,
at 20-25. Chapter One Weighted Average Daily Attendance ("CWADA") is a weighing system
that accounts for low-income students by giving them greater weight for public school finance
purposes. This has the effect of adjusting upward the average daily attendance of districts with
low-income students. Id.
249. See Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7, at 20-21. The foundation level was $2,384.25
per pupil in 1989-90. Id.
250. Id. at 21.
251. Id. at 20.
252. Id. The guaranteed tax base per CWADA student in 1989-90 was $125,486.84 for ele-
mentary school districts, $216,750.00 for high school districts, and $86,385.86 for unit districts.
Id.
253. Id. at 22 (stating that in 1989-90, each special equalization district received state aid
averaging $209.95 per CWADA student).
254. Id. at 23.
255. Id. at 20.
256. Id. at 23.
257. Id. at 20.
258. See id. at 24. For 1989-90, each alternative method district received state aid of between
$166.90 and $309.95 per CWADA student. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 24-25. In 1989-90, the flat grant was $166.89 per .CWADA student.
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obligation to help support their schools. The local school districts provide their
own funding for education primarily through local taxes.26' The local property
tax is the most substantial source of local tax revenue.262 The local school
districts all levy a minimum tax.263 The district voters may vote to increase the
tax rate to a statutory maximum.2 6' The use of local property tax revenue
allows local school districts to control the education of their children.265 How-
ever, it may also lead to disparities in funding for education between school
districts.266
Whether a finance system that allows such disparity in per-pupil expendi-
tures can continue to exist depends on the requirements of the Illinois Consti-
tution-specifically the education clause and the equal protection clause.
Thus, it is important to determine the requirements of both clauses as applied
to public school finance.
2. The Illinois Constitution
The Illinois Constitution was redrafted in 1970. Parties who wish to attack
the Illinois public school finance system may rely on two provisions in the
Illinois Constitution: the education clause26 and the equal protection clause.268
The education clause26 9 in the 1970 Illinois Constitution requires the state
to provide for "an efficient system of high quality public educational institu-
tions. '2 70 The clause also makes educational development "a fundamental goal
of the People of the State."1 17 1 Consequently, Illinois has a Category IV educa-
tion clause as identified above.2 72
261. See Schwartz, supra note 102, at 838.
262. Id. (stating that, in Illinois, over 90% of local tax revenue is raised through the real estate
property tax).
263. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, para. 17-2 (1989) (tax levies for cities with a population of
less than 500,000); id. para. 34-53 (tax levies for cities with a population of more than 500,000).
264. Id. para. 17-3 (1989) (for cities under 500,000 population).
265. See Schwartz, supra note 102, at 838-39.
266. See id. at 835-38, 836 n.25.
267. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
268. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
269. ILL. CONsT art. X, § 1. The education clause reads as follows:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all
persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall
be free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by
law.





272. Ratner, supra note 91, at 814-16. The 1870 Illinois Constitution also contained an educa-
tion clause. See ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. VIII, § I ("The General Assembly shall provide a thor-
ough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this State may receive a good
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A study of the 1970 Constitutional Convention, and in particular the com-
ments of the education committee, may reveal exactly what the education
clause requires of the public school finance system in Illinois. At the conven-
tion, most educational experts and education committee members agreed that
the education clause in the 1870 Illinois Constitution did not emphasize the
modern importance of education.27 3 The clause required only that the General
Assembly provide a "thorough and efficient" system of public schools in order
to ensure a "good common school education" for all public school pupils. 7'
The education committee noted that "[t]he existing constitutional provision
[was] not adequate to express the importance now given to the educational
enterprise and its critical influence on the common welfare."2 75 Thus, the edu-
cation committee set out to draft an education clause that would emphasize
the importance of education.
The new education clause was intended to do more than equip students to
perform their duties as good citizens. 7 6 The clause had to emphasize the need
for the state to provide an education for the "maximum development of per-
sons of every level of competence, highest to lowest.1 277 Accordingly, the com-
mittee noted that:
[T]he objective that all persons be educated to the limits of their capacities
would require expansion beyond the traditional public school programs. It
[would] recognize[] the need of the person with a physical handicap or
mental deficiency who nevertheless is educable .... The objective [was] to
provide each person an opportunity to progress to the limit of his ability.
27
However, the final, adopted version of the education clause did not contain a
proposed "Section 4" that would have required the state to provide the major
source of revenue to the public schools. 279 The committee members who made
common school education."). However, that clause may be classified as a Category II education
clause. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (noting that one characteristic of a category
II clause is that it requires public schools to reach a thorough and efficient level of quality). The
Supreme Court of Washington in Seattle School District No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash.
1978), struck down the state's school finance system as violative of Washington's Category IV
education clause. Id. at 104. The court held that the education clause required more than a "basic
education." Id. at 96. Instead, the clause placed an affirmative, paramount duty on the state to
guarantee ample, dependable funding to provide a basic program of education. Id. Since the state
depended on special excess levies to provide funding for education, the state had not met the
constitutional mandate. Id. at 104.
273. JANE G. BURESH, A FUNDAMENTAL GOAL: EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF ILLINOIS 37
(1975).
274. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 1.
275. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS. supra note 1, at 233.
276. See BURESH, supra note 273, at 37.
277. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 233.
278. Id. at 234.
279. Id. at 291. The proposed section stated:
To meet the goals of Section 1, substantially all funds for the operational costs of the
free public schools shall be appropriated by the General Assembly for the benefit of
the local school districts. No local governmental unit or school district may levy taxes
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the proposal intended it to "equalize tax ratios throughout the State," 280 to
"permit all districts to benefit from the taxes paid by industry,' 281" and "to
produce a level of educational opportunity that would be more equal through-
out the state for all children.1
28 2
The fact that the adopted version of the education clause does not include
"Section 4" or similar language may impede court reform of educational fi-
nance. 282 However, one education committee member expressed the possibility
that the language in the education clause actually encourages court reform.2
84
He speculated that if the Illinois school financing system were challenged in
the courts, the new equal protection clause, together with the education
clause's "efficient system" language, should compel a finding that the system
violates both the equal protection clause and the education clause.2 8 However,
an Illinois court may not reach that conclusion because it may reason that the
convention, having addressed itself to school finance in the last sentence of the
education clause, did not intend any other provisions of the new Illinois Con-
stitution to govern school financing.2 8  But the committee member added, "[I]f
the legislature and the new state Board of Education will take the school fi-
nancing language for what it is- . . . the urgent prayer for a fair solu-
tion-then they will act to equalize educational opportunity and the tax bur-
or appropriate funds for the purposes of such educational operation except to the
extent of ten percent (10%) of the amount received by that district from the General
Assembly in that year.
Id. at 295.
280. Id. at 299.
281. Id.
282. Id. The committee members who. made the proposal also supported the proposed section
by noting, "The principal benefit of the proposed Section is that by limiting the amount a local
district can raise to a function of the amount spent by the State, it becomes incumbent upon those
who desire to spend more at home to work to raise the level throughout the State." Id. at 298.
These committee members also expressed opposition to funding of education via the property tax.
The members stated:
In recent years there has been increasing resistance by the voters to increases in prop-
erty tax rates. Schools have been the chief victims of this reaction. This is because the
voters have the chance to vote in referenda to increase school tax rates and additional
taxes for bond issues. If the State should take over most of the cost of operating the
elementary and secondary schools, the tax burden would be shifted to state tax reve-
nues, probably to the income tax . ...
Id.
283. See BURESH, supra note 273, at 125 (quoting Malcolm M. Kamin, delegate to the Illinois
Constitutional Convention and education committee member).
284. Id.
285. Id. The relevant language of the education clause states that "[t]he State shall provide for
an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services." ILL. CONST. art.
X, § 1. This language mandates that the state provide an efficient system of public schools in
order to meet the clause's fundamental goal: "[t]he educational development of all persons ... to
the limits of their capabilities." ILL. CONST., art. X, § I constitutional commentary (Robert A.
Helman & Wayne W. Whalen, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1971)).
286. See BURESH, supra note 273, at 125.
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dens of educational financing without further judicial intervention. 2 87
A second provision in the 1970 Illinois Constitution that is relevant to public
school financing is the equal protection clause. While the Illinois Constitution
of 1870 included an education clause, "8 it did not contain an equal protection
clause. However, the 1970 drafters added an equal protection clause to the bill
of rights. 89 The drafters of the provision intended that it embody the same
concept as the Federal Equal Protection Clause.2 90 The committee noted that
including an equal protection clause in the Illinois Constitution reaffirmed a
concept that had been recognized and accepted in Illinois years ago-equal
protection of the laws. " '
The Illinois equal protection guarantee gives no additional interpretation to
the words "equal protection" than does the Federal Equal Protection
Clause.292 Not surprisingly, the Illinois courts have adopted federal equal pro-
tection analysis.2" Furthermore, Illinois courts have essentially adopted the
United States Supreme Court's criteria for defining a suspect class and a fun-
damental right. 94 The education committee at the Illinois Constitutional Con-
vention rejected a proposed equal protection clause that may have articulated
a fundamental right to public education. 95
287. Id. at 126.
288. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 1.
289. The clause states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
290. See 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 3043.
291. 6 id. at 19.
292. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.") with ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 ("No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.").
293. See Aldridge v. Boys, 424 N.E.2d 886 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that equal protection
analysis, under the rational relationship test, asks whether state action resulting in unequal treat-
ment has a rational relationship to a state purpose); Panko v. County of Cook, 356 N.E.2d 859
(Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (stating that the equal protection test, under both the Federal and Illinois
Constitutions, is a bifurcated inquiry that first identifies purposes or objectives of the legislative
scheme and then asks whether the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legis-
lative purpose).
294. See People ex rel. Defanis v. Barr, 397 N.E. 895 (Ill. App. Ct.), affid, 414 N.E.2d 731
(II1. 1979) (holding that distinctions not based on race, alienage, or gender will be upheld against
an equal protection claim if the distinctions are rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest); Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 412 N.E.2d 151 (II1. 1980) (stating that a
person's right to housing is a non-fundamental right, and should be examined under a rational
relationship standard of judicial review in determining whether the equal protection clause has
been violated); Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid, 418 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding
that when social and economic legislation is challenged as being in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause, the rational relation test is the appropriate level of judicial review).
295. Member Proposal No. 214 read as follows:
No person shall be subjected to any discrimination in his rights for or in ... public
education, or in any other of his inherent and inalienable rights because of race, color,
religion, national ancestry, sex, or physical or mental disability, by any individual or
by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the State or any agency or subdivision
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3. Illinois Public School Finance Case Law
In addition to examining provisions in the Illinois Constitution, advocates
for reform of Illinois' public school finance system must examine Illinois case
law. Three lines of case law exist that are relevant to the validity of the Illinois
public school finance system under the Illinois Constitution: attacks on the
system based upon the education clause,2 96 attacks based upon the equal pro-
tection clause,2 97 and decisions involving public education of handicapped
students.
The Illinois courts have not upheld a school finance challenge based upon
the education clause.298 The courts' position has been one of extreme deference
to the General Assembly.299 As to school finance systems, an Illinois court has
stated, "[T]he creation of school systems and the manner of financing and
administering them is clearly a legislative prerogative and . . . our judicial
system cannot impose its views, its ideas, and its will upon the General Assem-
bly."' 00 According to Illinois courts, the education clause grants to the Gen-
eral Assembly the unrestricted authority to form school districts and establish
the public school system in Illinois. 301
Blase v. State"°2 represents one of the few times that the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the requirements of the education clause in a school finance
context. In Blase, the court dealt a blow to the school finance reform move-
ment when it held that the school finance language in the education clause was
only hortatory and thus imposed no legally enforceable duty on the General
Assembly to provide a majority of the funds for public education. 303 While
of the State.
7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 2934.
296. ILL. CONST. art. X, § I.
297. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
298. The courts may have the opportunity to uphold such a challenge in the near future. On
November 13, 1990 the Committee for Educational Rights filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of
Cook County against then-Governor James R. Thompson, State Superintendent of Education
Robert Leininger, and the State Board of Education. The lawsuit alleges that the Illinois school
finance system violates the 1970 Illinois Constitution's education clause, equal protection clause,
and special legislation clause. This suit is discussed and fully referenced supra note 238 and ac-
companying text.
299. See, e.g., Cronin v. Lindberg, 360 N.E.2d 360, 365 (III. 1976) ("This court has consist-
ently held that the question of efficiency of the educational system is properly left to the wisdom
of the legislature."); Board of Educ. v. Cronin, 367 N.E.2d 501, 503 (I11. App. Ct. 1977) ("Even
if [a court] might consider the legislative intent of certain public school legislation to be unwise,
unjust, oppressive or unworkable, [the court] is nevertheless mindful that such legislative errors
are not subject to judicial review.").
300. Board of Educ. v. Cronin, 367 N.E.2d at 504.
301. Id. at 503.
302. 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973). In Blase, a group of taxpayers sued the superintendent of
public education on behalf of their children, claiming the education clause required the state to
provide not less than 50% of the funds required to maintain public schools. Id. at 47.
303. Id. at 49. Importantly, the court found hortatory that part of the education clause that
states, "The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education." Id.
The court based its decision on the fact that amendments "designed to make specific the respec-
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Blase did not foreclose all future school finance litigation, it reaffirmed the
traditional deferential position of the Illinois courts toward public school fi-
nance-a position established under the 1870 Constitution. 4 Blase also set
the tone for future Illinois public school finance litigation.
The Blase court's interpretation of the education clause in the 1970 consti-
tution indicated that the Illinois courts would require no more of the new edu-
cation clause than they did of the education clause in the 1870 constitution. 305
The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the "thorough and efficient" edu-
cation clause in the 1870 Constitution to impose only two limitations:30 6 first,
that the established school system be free; and second, that the system be open
to all without discrimination. 30 7 Consequently, any other questions as to the
public school's thoroughness or efficiency are "solely for the legislature to an-
swer and ...the courts lack [the] power to intrude."308 Thus, the court held
that, with respect to the amount of money that the state must provide for the
financing of its public schools, the education clause in the 1970 constitution
did not differ from its predecessor in the 1870 constitution. 09
A second line of Illinois case law involves the equal protection clause in the
1970 constitution. When confronted with state equal protection challenges to
the public school finance system, Illinois courts have refused to apply height-
ened scrutiny. 10 The latest equal protection challenge to the Illinois public
school finance system was made in People ex rel. Jones v. Adams.31 1 Although
tive responsibilities of local school districts and the State for educational financing were defeated."
Id. at 48; see also Polich v. Chicago Sch. Fin. Auth., 402 N.E.2d 247, 254 (I1l. 1980) (following
Blase, stating that article X, § 1 of the state constitution imposes no specific duty on the General
Assembly and that school finance is properly left to the wisdom of the General Assembly). Inter-
preting the framers' intent by examining the constitutional proceedings appears to be the Illinois
courts' normal mode of analysis. See, e.g., Hamer v. Board of Educ., 265 N.E.2d 616, 620 (I11.
1970) ("In determining the intention and purpose of a constitutional provision, this court will look
to the natural and popular meaning of the language used as it was understood at the time the
constitution was adopted."); 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 3547, 3550, 3552,
3570.
304. The 1870 Illinois Constitution's education clause required that "[tihe General Assembly
shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free-schools, whereby all children of this State
may receive a good common school education." ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. VIII, § 1.
305. Id.
306. People v. Deatherage, 81 N.E.2d 581, 586 (I11. 948).
307. Id.
308. Id.; see also People v. Barrington Consol. High Sch. Dist., 71 N.E.2d 86, 89 (I11. 947)
("There is no constitutional restriction or limitation placed upon the Legislature with reference to
the formation of school districts or the agencies which the Legislature shall adopt to provide the
system of free schools, and the General Assembly may .. .confer upon the respective local au-
thorities or boards of education the power of taxation to the extent of the Legislature's will.").
309. Id. But cf. Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1298-99 (I11. 1990)
(suggesting that the Illinois Supreme Court is willing to impose an affirmative duty on the state to
provide efficient, high quality public schools by stating that education is a compelling state
interest).
310. See Polich v. Chicago Sch. Fin. Auth., 402 N.E.2d 247 (II1. 1980); People ex rel. Jones v.
Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (I11. 976).
311. 350 N.E.2d 767 (III. 1976). In Adams, defendant parents of school-age children who re-
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the defendants claimed that the system violated their equal protection rights
under both the federal and state equal protection clauses, 12 the court held
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguezs controlled.31' In fact, the court did not men-
tion the Illinois equal protection clause as a separate basis for its decision.3"
Consequently, the court applied the minimal scrutiny analysis of Rodriguez to
the finance system. 18
Importantly, the court acknowledged that in Rodriguez, although the
United States Supreme Court purported to apply the same minimal scrutiny
ordinarily applied in equal protection cases, the court actually fashioned an-
other standard of scrutiny.317 The Illinois court acknowledged that the scru-
tiny used by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez was more restrictive than ordi-
nary minimal scrutiny, but was less restrictive than strict judicial scrutiny. 8'
While the principle of local control of schools was "valid" and "justifie[d] a
state's reliance on local real estate taxes in financing public schools," 319 the
Equal Protection Clause could tolerate discrimination among school districts
due to reliance upon real estate taxes "only if it [was] not invidious." 320 Fur-
thermore, invidiousness was measured by two factors: the adequacy of the edu-
cation provided by the complaining parties' schools, and the size of the dispar-
ity in expenditures per student between the public school districts.321 As a
consequence, a finance system could deny pupils in the poorest school districts
equal protection of the laws while remaining constitutional as to pupils in
wealthier school districts.322
As the Adams decision demonstrates, Illinois has not recognized a funda-
sided in poor school districts claimed the Illinois public school finance system violated the Illinois
and federal equal protection clauses because the system relied so heavily on local property taxes.
Id. at 770. Defendants challenged both the foundation program and the district power equalizing
system. Id. at 774-75. Defendants' district had an equalized assessed valuation that was $2,293.58
less per capita than the state average. Id. at 775. Defendants' school district levied a tax of $2.68
per $100-$0.04 higher than the state average. Id. This tax raised $165 less in per-pupil revenue
than the state average of $627 in real estate taxes per pupil. Id. Despite the foundation program
aid and equalization aid, defendants asserted the program violated their equal protection rights.
Id.
312. Id. at 774 (describing defendants' claims in Adams).
313. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
314. Adams, 350 N.E.2d at 775-76.
315. Id.






322. Id. The court reasoned that defendants had failed to carry the burden of showing the
finance system invidiously discriminated against pupils in their school districts. Id. Defendants
failed to introduce evidence concerning the adequacy of education provided by their school dis-
trict, and did not introduce evidence concerning the size of disparity in per-pupil expenditures
between their school district and wealthier school districts in the state. Id.
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mental right to an education. However, in Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Ed-
ucation,23 a recent, successful equal protection challenge to the Chicago
School Reform Act,3"" the Illinois Supreme Court suggested, in dicta, that a
fundamental right to an education exists in Illinois when it stated that educa-
tion was "a compelling state interest."3 25 In Fumarolo, plaintiffs successfully
argued that the Act's voting scheme for school board elections violated their
equal protection rights because it denied an equal vote to a large part of the
electorate. 26 The court noted that the operation of schools was a "fundamen-
tal governmental activity in which all members of society [had] an inter-
est.132 7 Consequently, limiting voter eligibility for school board elections was
not the least restrictive means for the state to provide a constitutionally ade-
quate education. 8 8 Fumarolo will affect any similar challenge to Illinois'
school finance system.
Decisions by Illinois courts concerning public education for handicapped
students make up a third line of case law relevant to the constitutional validity
of the Illinois public school finance system.33" The extreme deference of the
Illinois courts to the legislature in equal protection challenges and in chal-
323. 566 N.E.2d 1283 (III. 1990).
324. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, para. 34-1 to 34-129 (1989).
325. Fumarolo, 566 N.E.2d at 1298-99 ("[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining
the fabric of our society." (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982))). It is significant that
the Fumarolo court cited Plyler because that indicates federal equal protection jurisprudence re-
mains a strong influence on Illinois equal protection litigation after Rodriguez. Thus, there should
be, at a minimum, a quasi-fundamental right to education in Illinois. See supra notes 47-81 and
accompanying text (describing federal equal protection adjudication in the school finance area and
noting the development of a quasi-fundamental right to an education under the Federal
Constitution).
326. Fumarolo, 566 N.E.2d at 1293. The Chicago School Reform Act decentralized the public
school system by placing primary responsibility for local school governance on parents, community
residents, teachers, and school principals. Id. at 1286. The Act created local school councils for
each grammar school and high school in the Chicago public school system. Id. Each local school
council was made up of six parents of currently enrolled students, elected by the parents of cur-
rently enrolled students, two residents of the attendance area, elected by the residents of that area,
and two school teachers, elected by that school's staff. Id.
327. Id. at 1298.
328. Id. at 1300.
329. See, e.g., Elliot v. Board of Educ., 380 N.E.2d 1137 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that the
education clause in the 1970 constitution requires the state to provide more than a basic education
for all handicapped children); Doe v. Sanders, 545 N.E.2d 454 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that
the state must pay for the public education of children residing in homes for treatment of sub-
stance abuse); Walker v. Cronin, 438 N.E.2d 582 (II1. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that the state must
reimburse a parent who unilaterally placed her child in a non-public school after the school failed
to provide a due process hearing); School Dist. No. 153, Cook County v. School Dist. No. 154 'h,
Cook County, 370 N.E.2d 22 (III. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that children leaving their districts to
receive residential treatment are entitled to a state-funded education). But see, e.g., Pierce v.
Board of Educ., 370 N.E.2d 535, 536 (I11. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that the education clause in
the 1970 Illinois Constitution does not impose a duty on boards of education to place students in
special education classes, since the clause is not self-executing, i.e. the clause does not mandate
that "certain means be provided in any specific form").
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lenges based upon the education clause is in sharp contrast to similar chal-
lenges made on behalf of handicapped or disabled students.330
Regarding such challenges based upon the education clause, an Illinois
court has held that "the present constitution establishe[d] an entitlement
broader than the former provision [the education clause in the 1870 Constitu-
tion] which mandated only free common school education."331 The same court
noted that, when read with the constitutional history, the education clause in
the 1970 constitution "incorporates programs of instruction other than the
standard course of study established in the public school system." 32 Further-
more, the court was willing to find that the language in the education clause,
which proclaims that "[tihe State shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services," 333 was not hortatory. s3
Instead, the court in Walker v. Cronin held that the education clause, through
the controlling funding statute, 35 granted "an appropriate education for all
handicapped children. '336 In addition, the court found that an "overriding ob-
jective" of the education clause and the controlling funding statute was "pro-
viding an appropriate education for each child in light of his individual
needs." 3 '
330. See Elliot, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (where parents of handicapped child
claimed the School Code, which limited the amount of tuition which the state, through its school
districts, had to pay for the special education of handicapped students who had been excluded
from the public schools and had to attend special education facilities, violated the education clause
in the Illinois constitution because the education clause required a free public education including
more than just the standard course of instruction); Walker, 438 N.E.2d 582 (holding the school
district must pay for special services rendered to the student by a private special education school
although the mother unilaterally placed the student in the program before the public school deter-
mined it was appropriate).
331. Elliot, 380 N.E.2d at 1142.
332. Id.
333. The clause states: "The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public
educational institutions and services. Education in the public schools through the secondary level
shall be free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law."
ILL. CoN s. art. X, § 1, para. 2.
334. Elliot, 380 N.E.2d at 1142-43. The court interpreted language from the transcripts of the
proceedings at the 1970 Constitutional Convention to find that the drafters of the clause did not
intend the language in the second paragraph of section one of the education clause to be simply
hortatory. Id. Particularly, the court relied on the education committee's statement that "'[tihe
objective that all persons be educated to the limits of their capacities would require expansion
beyond the traditional public school programs.'" Id. at 1142 (quoting 6 RECORD OF PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 1, at 234 (emphasis added by court)). Furthermore, the court noted the Commit-
tee's statement, "'The State is mandated to provide a system that is thorough, complete, and
useful to all the people of Illinois.'" Id. at 1143 (quoting 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note
1, at 764).
335. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 14-8.02 (1989).
336. Walker v. Cronin, 438 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
337. Id. at 586; see also supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (noting that the education
committee at the Illinois Constitutional Convention intended the new education clause to provide
ar appropriate education for all students).
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II. ANALYSIS: THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION MANDATES PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCE REFORM
The 1970 Illinois Constitution's education clause provides an educational
entitlement that the Blase court did not acknowledge. In Blase v. State, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the education clause imposed no legally en-
forceable duty on the General Assembly to provide a majority of the funds
necessary for education. 38 In fact, the court interpreted the clause to require
only that the state provide a free public education, and that the state offer
public education to all without discrimination.8 9 Thus, for an Illinois court to
hold that the state must provide an equal educational opportunity for each
student, the court would have to break from Blase. However, the education
clause and the equal protection clause both warrant doing so.
This Section argues that the education clause of the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion mandates the conclusion that the public school finance system in Illinois is
unconstitutional for four reasons: First, the drafters of the clause intended it to
require the state to provide an equal educational opportunity for all persons,
but the present finance system provides an unequal educational opportunity for
students in school districts having low property values. Second, while the edu-
cation clause requires the state to provide "high quality" and "efficient" public
schools, the finance system fails to provide such schools for students in the
property-poor school districts. Third, the clause mandates that the state pro-
vide an "appropriate" education for all persons, but Illinois courts have only
extended that mandate to handicapped students. Fourth, courts in states with
less demanding education clauses, but with similar finance systems and similar
disparities in per-pupil expenditures, have interpreted their education clauses
to mandate school finance reform. These decisions in other states render the
Illinois courts' interpretation of the 1970 Illinois Constitution's education
clause illegitimate. Under a more well reasoned interpretation of the 1970 Illi-
nois Constitution, the education clause mandates public school finance reform.
This Section further argues that the public school finance system is uncon-
stitutional under the state constitution's equal protection clause. Although the
courts have not recognized it, the right to an appropriate education is a funda-
mental right in Illinois because the state constitution implicitly guarantees
that right. The vast disparity in per-pupil spending in Illinois directly affects
the educational resources available to the students. This constitutes a denial of
equal treatment of students entitled to receive an equal educational opportu-
nity from the state. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the finance system in Illi-
nois is unconstitutional because the system is not necessarily related to a com-
pelling state interest.
338. Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Il1. 1973).
339. See supra notes 305-09 and accompanying text (discussing Blase, and noting that this
interpretation of the education clause places no more emphasis on the state's role in public educa-
tion than did the 1870 education clause).
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A. The 1970 Illinois Constitution's New Educational Mandate
Illinois courts have held, incorrectly, that the 1970 Illinois Constitution is
substantially the same as the 1870 Illinois Constitution with respect to educa-
tion.840 A comparison between the education clause in the 1970 Illinois Consti-
tution841 and its counterpart in the 1870 Illinois Constitution,4 2 in light of
their underlying objectives, reveals crucial differences between the two clauses.
These crucial differences clearly demonstrate the 1970 constitution's expres-
sion of the modern importance of education that the 1870 Constitution lacked.
Consequently, the interpretation by Illinois courts of the 1970 constitution's
education clause as wholly consistent with the 1870 constitution's education
clause is misplaced.3 43 An Illinois court that applies a more accurate interpre-
tation of the 1970 constitution's education clause must conclude that the pub-
lic school finance system is unconstitutional.
The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution realized that the education
clause in the 1870 constitution was not sufficient to express the modern impor-
tance of education and its influence on public welfare.344 The objective of the
education committee was to draft an education clause that would require the
state to expand public education beyond traditional programs.34 5 In fact, the
drafters realized the need for the state to provide a public education that was
flexible enough to allow a person of any level of competence to maximize his
or her educational development.3 46 Thus, the convention adopted a clause that
embodied the objective to provide each person, including a person with a
mental or physical handicap, the opportunity to progress to the limit of his or
her ability.347 Accordingly, the education clause makes educational develop-
ment "[a] fundamental goal of the People of the State," 348 and requires the
state to provide only "high quality public educational institutions and ser-
vices."'349 Most important to the discussion here, the clause gives the state the
"primary responsibility for financing the system of public education."350
The plain language and objectives of the education clause in the 1970 con-
stitution are in sharp contrast to those characteristics of the 1870 constitu-
tion's education clause. The 1870 clause ensured only "a system of free
schools."351 It required the state to provide only "a good common school edu-
340. See supra notes 298-309 and accompanying text.
341. ILL. CONSr. art. X, § 1.
342. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 1.
343. See supra notes 298-309 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois courts' deferential
interpretation of the Illinois Constitution's education clause).
344. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text (discussing the education committee's in-
tention to emphasize the importance of education in the new education clause).
345. See 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 234.
346. 6 Id.
347. 6 Id.
348. ILL. CONSr. art. X, § 1.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 1.
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cation" for public school students.3 15 Accordingly, Illinois courts interpreted
the 1870 education clause to require only that the public school system be free
and that it be open to all without discrimination. 5
One need look no further than Illinois history books to realize that the 1870
Constitutional Convention drafted its education clause in a vastly different so-
cial and political environment than did the 1970 convention. 354 Consequently,
the driving forces behind the two clauses differ significantly. The intended re-
quirements of both clauses reflect these differences.
The 1870 Constitutional Convention took place during the Reconstruction
Era, following the Civil War.355 During the ten-year period from 1860-1870,
Illinois' population had increased by about fifty percent." Chicago's popula-
tion had nearly tripled in size, with foreign-born persons constituting almost
one-half its population.57 Thus, the 1870 conventioneers were faced with the
problems accompanying the change from an agrarian state to an industrial-
ized, urban state;35  a problem that Illinois had not faced in the past. 359
Importantly, the 1848 Illinois Constitution, the predecessor to the 1870 con-
stitution, did not even mention education.3 60 In fact, only recently had the
constitutions of other states begun to recognize the government's role in fi-
nancing public education. 61 Thus, the drafters of the 1870 education clause
placed a constitutional obligation on the state that the state had not previously
acknowledged.3 62 Not surprisingly, the convention decided to include the edu-
cation clause only after heated debate regarding whether the Illinois Constitu-
tion should even mention education.3 6 In addition, the 1870 convention even
contemplated establishing separate state supported schools for white and black
children.3 64
352. Id.
353. See supra notes 305-09 and accompanying text.
354. See JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970, at 56-59 (1972).
355. Id. at 56.
356. Id. at 57.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. The conventioneers drafted a constitution that could tame the "growing unmanageability
of the legislature." Id. at 58. Indeed, Governor Oglesby called the 1870 Constitutional Convention
largely because the Illinois General Assembly was receiving a flood of private bills. Id. at 56.
Illinois citizens at that time used the General Assembly for private matters such as chartering
corporations, incorporating towns, granting divorces, remitting fines, and regulating interest rates.
Id. By 1867, the amount of private bills vastly outnumbered the amount of public bills. Id.
360. See id. at 72.
361. See id.
362. See Orville Alexander, Education, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION 438, 438 (Victoria Ranney ed., 1970).
363. See CORNELIUS, supra note 354, at 73. The northern counties, whose proportion of taxable
property was greater than their proportion of school children, objected to the idea of appropriating
funds for education from across the entire state and then apportioning those funds among the
counties, according to population. id.
364. Id. The adopted clause provided that the state would support the public education of all
children from one general fund. See ILL. CONST. Of 1870, art. VIII, § 1.
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In contrast, the 1970 Constitutional Convention delegates faced different,
unique issues, and the education clause in the 1970 constitution reflects an
attempt to resolve those issues. In 1970, Illinois faced social, economic, and
political problems that were vastly different and more complex than those the
1870 drafters faced.861 5 By 1970, Illinois had become highly urbanized and in-
dustrialized, and government regulation and public services had expanded
enormously. 66 Unlike the 1870 convention delegates who drafted a document
that expanded state government into many new areas such as education, the
1970 convention delegates devoted most of their time and energy to improving
specific areas and restating Illinois' organic law.367
Regarding education, the 1970 convention delegates, unlike their counter-
parts in 1870, did not have before them a constitution that failed to mention
education. Consequently, the 1970 convention, in contrast to its 1870 counter-
part, sought simply to redefine the state's role in public education, rather than
create such a role. 66 The 1970 convention debates focused on the extent of
that existing state role in education. 69 The delegates never contemplated dis-
pensing with the state's role in supporting public education; instead, they de-
bated the significance of the state's support. 3 0
Thus, Illinois courts should interpret the 1970 clause to impose different
requirements on the state than did the 1870 clause for at least three reasons:
First, the language in the 1870 constitution's education clause differs from
that of the 1970 constitution. Second, the two clauses were drafted in two
vastly different time periods under differing social, economic, and historical
conditions. Finally, the objectives of the two clauses are significantly different.
Illinois courts, however, have failed to differentiate between the two
clauses.8"' As a result, Illinois courts have ignored the greater responsibilities
that the 1970 clause places on the state: that the state "expand beyond the
traditional public school programs, 817 ' and that the state take the "primary
responsibility" to fund the public school system.373
365. See Paul G. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its Nature and Purpose, in CON-CON: IS-
SUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 362, at 3, 28.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See BURESH, supra note 273, at 34-38.
369. Id. at 37-47. "[lit was the topic of educational objectives that caused the most dissension
among the members of the Committee on Education at the 1969-1970 convention." Id. at 38.
370. Id. at 37 ("In 1970 everyone agreed that a statement was needed that would place a
greater emphasis on the importance of education. How this was to be done and what was to be
said [was] a source of much controversy.").
371. See supra notes 305-09 and accompanying text (noting that Illinois courts have inter-
preted the new education clause in a way that places no more emphasis on education than did the
previous clause). But see Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283 (II1. 1990). In
Fumarolo, the Illinois Supreme Court clearly recognized that the 1970 Illinois Constitution's edu-
cation clause places much more emphasis on education than did its 1870 Illinois Constitution
counterpart. Id. at 1298-1300.
372. See 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 234.
373. ILL. CONST. art. X, § I ("The state has the primary responsibility for financing the system
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Blase v. States"' demonstrated the Illinois Supreme Court's unwillingness to
properly expand the state's role in financing public education. The court may
have correctly determined that the drafters of the education clause in the 1970
constitution did not intend to require the state to provide a specific percentage
of the funds needed to operate and maintain public schools. 75 However, the
court overlooked an objective of the education clause itself-to make educa-
tional development "a fundamental goal" of the state"7'-when it held that
the school finance language in the education clause877 was only hortatory378
While the clause may not impose a legal duty on the state to provide a specific
percentage of funds for education, it does hold the state primarily responsible
for ensuring that all public schools are "efficient" and of "high quality. ' 79
The intended meanings of efficiency and high quality embody "expansion be-
yond the traditional public school programs" to allow each person the opportu-
nity to progress to the limit of his or her ability. 80 Thus, while the school
finance language in the education clause may be only hortatory regarding spe-
cific dollar amounts of state support for education, it certainly imposes a "re-
sponsibility" on the state to ensure "efficient" and "high quality" public
schools. Importantly, that state responsibility extends over and above providing
simply a "good common school education."381
B. The Illinois Courts' Refusal To Adopt The Mandate of the New
Education Clauses
Illinois courts have improperly extended their analyses of the 1870 constitu-
tion's education clause to apply to its counterpart in the 1970 constitution.
This unwarranted extension simply ignores the intended purpose of the re-
drafted education clause. The drafters intended the new education clause to
expand the state's role in financing public education, not to restrict it.382 In
People v. Deatherage,8 3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the language in
the 1870 education clause was hortatory: it required only that (1) public edu-
of public education.").
374. 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973).
375. Id. at 48.
376. ILL. CONST. art. X, § I ("A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational
development of all persons to the limits of their capacity.").
377. "The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education."
ILL. Co NsT. art. X, § 1.
378. See Blase. 302 N.E.2d at 49.
379. ILL. CONST. art. X, § I ("The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality
public educational institutions and services.").
380. See 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 234.
381. See supra notes 273-87 and accompanying text (noting that the education committee at
the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention intended to expand the state's role in public
education).
382. See supra notes 273-87 and accompanying text.
383. 81 N.E.2d 581 (III. 1948).
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cation be free; and (2) the system be free from discrimination.384 Conse-
quently, all other questions regarding the public schools' thoroughness or effi-
ciency were clearly the legislature's prerogative, and courts could not
intrude. 85 In a post-1970 case, Cronin v. Lindberg," the court essentially
applied Deatherage, stating, "This court has consistently held that the ques-
tion of efficiency of the educational system is properly left to the wisdom of
the legislature. 387 In addition, in Polich v. Chicago School Finance Author-
ity8" the Illinois Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Blase and inter-
preted the 1970 education clause to impose no duty on the state.' " The court
concluded that school finance is properly left to the wisdom of the General
Assembly. ° Recent decisions fail to adopt even the language in the new edu-
cation clause. An Illinois appellate court has referred to the duty that the
education clause imposes on the state as "a duty to establish a thorough and
efficient system of free schools."'39
These decisions ignore the differences in both language and purpose that
exist between the 1870 education clause and its 1970 counterpart. The educa-
tion clause in the 1970 constitution requires the state to provide much more
than a "thorough and efficient system of free schools." '92 The 1970 clause
orders the state to provide an "efficient system of high quality public educa-
tional institutions and services."393 Furthermore, these decisions fail to con-
sider that the 1970 conventioneers realized that the 1870 clause was "not ade-
quate to express the importance now given to the educational enterprise and
its critical influence on the common welfare. 394 Clearly, the 1970 convention
delegates did not intend to allow Illinois courts to continue interpreting the
language in the education clause as a hortatory restatement of the 1870
clause.395 In fact, one issue upon which nearly all education committee mem-
bers, witnesses, and experts agreed was that the education committee should
strengthen the education clause so that it would place a greater emphasis on
education.3 96 Thus, the Illinois courts' interpretation of the education clause of
the 1970 constitution as wholly consistent with the 1870 education clause dis-
regards the underlying objective of the 1970 clause-to place a greater respon-
sibility on the state to finance public education so as to ensure that public
384. Id. at 586.
385. Id.
386. 360 N.E.2d 360 (111. 976).
387. Id. at 365.
388. 402 N.E.2d 247 (l11. 1980).
389. Id. at 254.
390. Id.
391. Board of Educ. v. Cronin, 367 N.E.2d 501, 504 (I11. 1977).
392. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
393. Id. (emphasis added).
394. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 233.
395. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text (discussing the education committee's in-
tent to emphasize the importance of education in the new education clause).
396. See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
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students attend "high quality" and "efficient" schools. 9
C. Why the Illinois Public School Finance System Violates the 1970
Constitution's Education Clause
Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education398 represents a more accurate in-
terpretation of the 1970 education clause-an interpretation that acknowl-
edges the greater emphasis that the 1970 constitution places on education. In
Fumarolo, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the preamble of the new edu-
cation clause, which proclaims that "the educational development of all per-
sons to the limit of their capacities" is a "fundamental goal" of the people of
Illinois,399 makes education a compelling state interest.400 Arguably, this hold-
ing places an affirmative duty on the state to provide constitutionally adequate
schools.40 1 Fumarolo rejects, at a minimum, the holding in Blase that the lan-
guage in the education clause is only hortatory.'02
In order to remain consistent with Fumarolo's added emphasis on educa-
tion, an Illinois court must conclude that the present finance system in Illi-
nois403 violates the education clause in the 1970 constitution. An interpretation
of the education clause that acknowledges the clause's language is more than
just hortatory requires the state to ensure that the public school system has
sufficient funds to meet the constitutional standards articulated by the educa-
tion clause. It is clear that the school finance language in the education
clause 04 alone does not impose a duty on the state to provide a specific level of
funding for public education.40 5 However, read as a whole, the education
clause mandates that: (1) the state public school system be at least capable of
allowing the "educational development of all persons to the limits of their ca-
pacities";40 6 (2) if the system is incapable of allowing that, then the state is
"primarily responsible" for funding the schools so that they are capable;' 07 (3)
the state shall provide "high quality" and "efficient" public schools;'08 and (4)
397. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
398. 566 N.E.2d 1283 (Ill. 1990).
399. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
400. Fumarolo, 566 N.E.2d at 1298-99.
401. "Constitutionally adequate" schools in Illinois are "efficient" and "high quality." They
allow "the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities." ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1.
402. See Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ill. 1973).
403. See ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 122, paras. 18-1 to 18-20 (1989).
404. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. ("The State has the primary responsibility for financing the sys-
tem of public education").
405. See supra notes 302-09 and accompanying text (discussing Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46
(Ill. 1973), in which the court held that the state is under no legal duty to provide the majority of
funds for education). In fact, the constitutional convention rejected a version of the education
clause that gave the state the "primary duty" to fund public schools. See 5 RECORD OF PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 1, at 4145-49.
406. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 234.




the state is "primarily responsible" for funding public schools so that they are
at least "efficient" and of "high quality."4 " The fact that the drafters of the
1970 education clause placed the primary responsibility for funding public
schools on the state is significant. Where the public school system is incapable
of educating all students to the limit of their capacities, or where the public
schools are not "efficient" or of "high quality," the state is responsible over all
others and must therefore devise a finance scheme that will meet the constitu-
tional standards. 10
Blase is not contrary to the proposition that the state must provide sufficient
funding to ensure both that the public schools are "efficient" and of "high
quality," and that they are at least capable of educating all students to the
"limits of their capacities." In Blase, the issue was whether the education
clause imposed an affirmative duty on the state to provide a specific percent-
age of funds to public schools. 1 The court held that it did not impose such a
duty on the state. 2 In contrast, the proposed interpretation here only reasons
that the state must serve as primary guarantor that the public schools be "effi-
cient" and of "high quality" so that they are capable of providing all persons
the ability to develop themselves to the limits of their capacities. Such an in-
terpretation of the education clause is entirely consistent with the constitu-
tional convention's objectives to "place a greater emphasis on the importance
of education"'4 13 and to require "expansion beyond traditional public school
programs."4" 4
Having determined the education clause's mandate in light of its plain lan-
guage and its legislative history, that mandate must be applied to the public
school finance system in Illinois. The public school finance system fails to meet
the required standards because it fails to provide efficient and high quality
schools that allow all students the opportunity to develop to the limits of their
capacities.
The disparity in per-pupil expenditures renders the finance system unconsti-
tutional. In fiscal year 1988, expenditures per pupil ranged from approxi-
mately $12,900 to less than $2100.4"' While this disparity in expenditures
alone may not render the system unconstitutional, the relationship in Illinois
between per-pupil expenditures and educational performance demonstrates
that the public schools are not efficient or of high quality. Students in wealthy
school districts4 6 had much higher scores in a statewide reading assessment
409. See id.
410. The education clause drafters intended "primary responsibility" to mean "whose responsi-
bility it is over all others." See 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 4147.
411. See Blase v. State, 360 N.E.2d 46, 49 (III. 1973).
412. Id.
413. See BURESH, supra note 273, at 37.
414. See 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 234.
415. Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7, at 144.
416. Wealthy school districts are those in the top one-quarter in equalized assessed valuation
per pupil. BURROUGHS & LEININGER. supra note 235, at vi.
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test than did students in poor school districts."1" Students from wealthy school
districts also fared better than students from poor school districts in a state-
wide mathematics assessment test. 18 They also had significantly higher ACT
scores than their counterparts from poor school districts." 9 In addition,
wealthy school districts employed a larger percent of teachers with advanced
degrees,2 0 and paid their teachers significantly higher salaries 2 ' than did poor
school districts. In sum, the quality of education a student receives is deter-
mined by the wealth of the district in which he or she lives. If the student lives
in a wealthy district, that student has a full educational opportunity. If the
student lives in a poor district, he or she is deprived of educational advantages.
Thus, the present public school finance system fosters unequal educational op-
portunity throughout Illinois.
It is evident that poor school districts are not providing efficient and high
quality public schools. Their students cannot possibly develop themselves to
the limits of their capacities. Consequently, the Illinois public school system is
unconstitutional. Since the state has the primary responsibility for providing a
constitutional system, it must devise a finance system that will equalize the
educational opportunity between wealthy and poor school districts so that all
public schools are efficient and of high quality. Accordingly, a constitutional
school finance system mandates providing greater funds for education for the
poorer school districts than the wealthier school districts, and the amount of
money spent per pupil in the poorer school districts must be capable of provid-
ing each pupil with an appropriate education from an efficient, high quality
institution.422
1. An Appropriate Education for All Students
The Illinois courts interpret the education clause to guarantee an appropri-
ate education for handicapped students but not for disadvantaged students
from poor school districts. Elliot v. Board of Education2 3 demonstrates the
417. Id. On a 500-point scale, the difference in favor of students in wealthy districts was at
least 33 points at each grade level. Id. Poor school districts are those in the bottom one-quarter of
assessed valuation per pupil. Id.
418. See id. On a 500-point scale, the difference in favor of students in wealthy districts was at
least 47 points at each grade level. Id.
419. See id. ACT scores run from I to 36. The average ACT composite score was 19.9 for
wealthy districts and 18.2 for poor districts. The average English score was 19.3 for wealthy dis-
tricts and only 18.1 for poor school districts. The average mathematics score was 19.1 for wealthy
districts and only 16.4 for poor districts. Id.
420. See id. at vii. At the elementary level, the percentage of teachers with at least masters
degrees was 44% in wealthy districts and 38% in poor districts; at the high school level the
difference was 69% in wealthy districts as compared to 38% in poor districts. Id.
421. Id. The differences in average teacher salaries between wealthy and poor districts were
$5800 at the elementary level, and $12,000 at the high school level. Id.
422. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 371 (N.J. 1990) (stating that the State of New
Jersey may be required to spend in excess of the norm in order to meet the needs of disadvantaged
students).
423. 380 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
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willingness of Illinois courts to use the education clause to ensure an equal
educational opportunity for handicapped students. 4 However, this position is
inconsistent with the unwillingness of the courts to use the clause to ensure an
equal educational opportunity for disadvantaged students in poor districts. Illi-
nois courts should use the reasoning in Elliot to conclude that the public
school finance system violates the education clause in poor school districts.
The court in Elliot acknowledged the clear differences in scope between the
1870 education clause and the 1970 education clause. It found that the 1970
clause "establishe[d] a broader entitlement" than the 1870 clause.'25 Thus,
the court reasoned that while the 1870 clause mandated only a free common
school education, the 1970 clause "incorporate[d] programs of instruction
other than the standard course of study established in the public school sys-
tem." 6 Furthermore, the court concluded that the wording in paragraph one
of section one of the education clause, providing that a "fundamental goal" of
the state is the "educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities,"""' was mandatory-not hortatory." Thus, the clause required the
state to meet the special educational needs of handicapped students.'29
Walker v. Cronin'30 further demonstrates the inconsistencies between school
finance decisions and decisions involving education for the handicapped.
There, the court interpreted the education clause to guarantee an "appropriate
education" for all handicapped students." 1 Furthermore, the court acknowl-
edged that the overriding objective of the education clause was to provide an
appropriate education for each student "in light of his individual needs.' 32
Clearly, Walker and Elliot demonstrate that Illinois courts are willing to re-
quire more of the education clause than simply free public schools, open to all
without discrimination.' 3 However, it is not clear why the court broadly inter-
prets the education clause in the area of education for the handicapped, but
not in the public school finance context.
Handicapped students and disadvantaged students from poor school districts
have similar needs, and thus Illinois courts should treat them similarly for the
purposes of financing public schools. Both groups require an "appropriate edu-
cation" that takes into account the special needs of the students. Handicapped
students require special education that the traditional common school educa-
424. Id. (holding that the 1970 Illinois Constitution's education clause required more than just
a basic education for all handicapped children; instead, it required an appropriate education).
425. Id. at 1142.
426. Id.
427. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
428. Elliot, 380 N.E.2d at 1142-43, 1142 n.4.
429. Id.
430. 438 N.E.2d 582 (II1. App. Ct. 1982).
431. Id. at 586.
432. Id.
433. See supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text (noting that Illinois courts have held that
the new education clause provides a broader entitlement to education than did the education
clause in the 1870 constitution).
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tion cannot provide; a handicapped student may not be able to benefit from
programs available within the public school system . 34 Thus, the handicapped
student has unique educational needs that the state is constitutionally required
to meet. 3 5 Similarly, students from poor school districts have special needs,
different from those of relatively advantaged students. 6 These needs include,
but are not limited to: counseling services to help students deal with the
problems associated with drugs, crime, or unsupportive families; alternative
education programs for potential dropouts; and adequate libraries and media
centers for students who do not have books at home. 37 Generally, in these
poor school districts a "significantly different approach to education is re-
quired" if the poor school districts and their disadvantaged students are to
succeed. 38 Of course, this may require funds over and above those spent in
relatively wealthy school districts.
Thus, the fact that Illinois courts broadly interpret the education clause in
the area of education for the handicapped to require the state to ensure an
"appropriate" education for all handicapped students, while restricting the
clause's scope in the public school finance context, cannot withstand analysis.
In both contexts, the state has the duty to fund the public schools so that all
students receive at least an "appropriate" education. Under an analysis consis-
tent with Elliot and Walker, a public school finance system that cannot effec-
tively account for the special needs of students in poor school districts is
unconstitutional.
2. Illinois' Outmoded Deference Toward School Finance
Courts in other states have given extensive interpretations to the education
clauses in their state constitutions. 39 Illinois courts, on the other hand, have
refused to interpret Illinois' education clause broadly. Consequently, in actual
practice, the Illinois education clause is very narrow in scope and lacking in
content regarding public school finance; however, the clause was intended to
be broad in scope and contain substantial obligations and requirements.""
Courts in other states have invoked the wide scope and substantial obligations
and requirements of their education clause to allow public school finance re-
form in their states."" These decisions undermine the legitimacy of Illinois
decisions that refuse to give true meaning to the Illinois education clause. A
fair reexamination of the Illinois education clause, consistent with well rea-
434. See Elliot, 380 N.E.2d at 1139.
435. Walker, 438 N.E.2d at 586.
436. See supra note 168 (explaining the special needs of poor, urban students).
437. See supra note 168.
438. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 401 (N.J. 1990).
439. See supra notes 141-80 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990)).
440. See supra notes 276-87 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (listing successful challenges to public
school finance systems based upon education clauses in state constitutions).
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soned decisions from other states, demonstrates that the public school finance
system in Illinois fails to meet the requirements of the education clause.
The disparities between public schools in Illinois are very similar to those
once existent in other states that have since struck down their public school
finance systems. A significant number of state courts have used the education
clauses in their state constitutions to render the school finance systems in those
states unconstitutional. " 2 The courts in all of these decisions faced the same
basic issue: the appropriateness of "an educational funding system that de-
pends on a combination of state and local taxes producing a disparity of ex-
penditures in the face of inverse disparity of need."""3 Illinois faces that same
issue.444 Both New Jersey's equalization system 4' and Texas' foundation pro-
gram 446 produced disparities between school districts very similar to those that
exist in Illinois." 7 Consequently, since the Illinois public school finance system
uses both the equalization system and a foundation program," 8 Illinois courts
should not stray far from the reasoning used by the courts in Abbott v.
Burke449 and Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby. 50
Arguably, the education clauses in the New Jersey Constitution,' 5' the
Texas Constitution,' 5 and the Wisconsin Constitution453 impose fewer obliga-
tions and requirements on the state than does Illinois' education clause. 454
Consequently, the Illinois clause should be a more effective tool for school
finance reform than those clauses. New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin all have
"Category II" education clauses.45 5 In general, each of these clauses requires a
public school system to reach some minimal level of quality, such as "thorough
and efficient.' 4" Thus, on its face, a Category II clause requires only that the
state finance a public school system so that it is thorough: "marked by com-
pleteness: ... carried through to completion ... with full attention to details:.
.marked by sound systematic attention to all aspects and details: ...com-
442. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (citing successful challenges in Kentucky, Mon-
tana, New Jersey, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia).
443. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 373 (N.J. 1990).
444. See supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text (describing the wide variation in per-pupil
expenditures in Illinois public schools).
445. N.J. STAT. ANN. j§ 18A:7A-I to 18A:7A-52 (West 1975); see also supra notes 127-39
and accompanying text (describing equalization systems generally).
446. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.002 to 16.008; see also supra notes 115-26 and accompany-
ing text (describing foundation programs generally).
447. Compare supra note 145 (noting a disparity of $1135 per pupil) with supra note 190
(noting a disparity of $17,221 per pupil) and supra note 237 (noting a disparity of $10,800 per
pupil).
448. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, paras. 18-1 to 18-20 (1989).
449. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
450. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
451. N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
452. TEx. Co NsT. art. VII, § 1.
453. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
454. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
455. Ratner, supra note 92, at 815 n.144.
456. See Thro, supra note 62, at 244.
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plete in all respects"'' 75 and efficient:
marked by ability to choose and use the most effective and least wasteful
means of doing a task or accomplishing a purpose: competent ... marked by
qualities, characteristics, or equipment that facilitate the serving of a pur-
pose or the performance of a task in the best possible manner: eminently
satisfactory in use .... 4"
Yet, the courts in Abbott and Kirby interpreted the education clauses of
their states to require much more than simply "completeness" and "compe-
tence." In New Jersey, a "thorough and efficient" education is one that allows
"disadvantaged children . . . to compete in, and contribute to, the society en-
tered by the relatively advantaged children."' "" It allows students from poor
school districts the opportunity to compete with relatively advantaged students
in the labor market.'6 0 Most importantly, a "thorough and efficient" education
requires the state to spend in excess of the norm to provide for the greater
needs of disadvantaged students. 61 In Texas, an "efficient system" of public
schools must provide for a "general diffusion of knowledge" statewide.' 62 Fur-
thermore, an "efficient system" of public schools requires a direct correlation
between the tax effort of each school district and the educational funds availa-
ble to it;' 63 but the system can also account for differing costs associated with
providing an equalized educational opportunity to disadvantaged students.' 6'
On its face, a Category IV clause, such as Illinois' education clause, man-
dates a much stronger commitment to education than does a Category II
clause.4 6 5 A model Category IV education clause makes providing an educa-
tion the "paramount" duty of the state. 66 Thus, by its plain meaning alone, a
Category IV clause requires the state to treat public school finance as a para-
mount responsibility, defined by Webster's Dictionary as "having a higher or
the highest rank or authority: . . . Chief, Supreme, Preeminent.' 4 67 Not sur-
prisingly, the Washington Supreme Court required Washington's Category IV
education clause to accomplish much more than simply place education at the
highest rank of the state's responsibilities.6 6 Indeed, in Washington the state
has the affirmative duty to ensure "as a first priority, fully sufficient funds"
457. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2380 (1981) [hereinafter WEB-
STER'S DICTIONARY].
458. Id. at 725.
459. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 1990) (citing Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 497
A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985)).
460. Id. at 382-89.
461. Id. at 371 (citing Abbott 1, 495 A.2d at -376).
462. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989).
463. Id. at 397.
464. Id. at 398.
465. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (describing four categories of foundation
clauses, and noting that category IV clauses impose the most stringent educational mandate).
466. Ratner, supra note 92, at 816.
467. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 457, at 1638.
468. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).
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that will provide "effective teaching and opportunities for learning."' 9 Conse-
quently, all persons in Washington have "a 'right' to be amply provided with
an education."'' 70 That right is constitutionally paramount. 71 Thus, as the
Washington decision demonstrates, the Category IV education clause in the
Illinois Constitution should serve as an effective tool for school reform.
Clearly, Illinois' clause should be a more likely candidate to accomplish school
finance reform than the Category II clauses in New Jersey, Texas, and Wis-
consin that mandate a minimum level of education but do not designate edu-
cation as the most important state duty. However, that has clearly not oc-
curred. The education clause in the Illinois Constitution has been an
ineffective tool for the school finance reform movement because Illinois courts
have refused to treat the clause as more than hortatory.472
The recent New Jersey and Texas decisions discredit the legitimacy of the
interpretation by the Illinois courts of the education clause in the Illinois Con-
stitution. The Illinois Supreme Court has clearly held that the language in the
education clause is only hortatory and thus imposes no legally enforceable
duty on the state.'73 According to decisions in Illinois, the clause requires only
that the state provide public schools free of charge, and that the schools be
open to all without discrimination."" Illinois courts may not even determine
whether the public schools are constitutionally adequate; that determination is
left to the General Assembly.' 75 This position is in contrast to the New Jersey
and Texas decisions, despite the fact that the Illinois education clause on its
face imposes more obligations and responsibilities on the state regarding edu-
cation than do the New Jersey and Texas clauses. Surprisingly, although pub-
lic schools in New Jersey, Texas, and Illinois suffer from similar disparities
and shortcomings, and fund their public schools by similar methods, the inter-
pretation by Illinois courts of the more-demanding Illinois education clause
imposes substantially fewer obligations on the state.
New Jersey and Texas courts have imposed on their respective states a re-
quirement that the finance scheme affirmatively address the unique needs of
relatively disadvantaged students. 7 Thus, the education clauses in New
Jersey and Texas require unequal per-pupil spending in favor of disadvantaged
students so that the disadvantaged students may compete in the labor market.
In addition, the clauses mandate a relationship between tax effort and availa-
ble funds for education. 77 In contrast, Illinois has a much more restrained
469. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
470. Id. at 92.
471. Id.
472. See, e.g., Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 49 (I1l. 1973).
473. Id.
474. People v. Deatherage, 81 N.E.2d 581, 586 (I11. 1948).
475. See supra notes 298-309 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's
holding in Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (II1. 1973)).
476. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (New Jersey); supra notes 194-203 and
accompanying text (Texas).
477. See supra text accompanying note 157 (New Jersey); supra notes 200-03 and accompany-
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interpretation of its more-demanding education clause. In fact, the interpreta-
tion by Illinois courts is so restrained, Illinois' category IV clause actually re-
sembles a Category I education clause."' Such an interpretation is unfounded,
and the recent decisions in New Jersey and Texas make it an anachronism.
However, unlike the courts in Abbott v. Burke and Edgewood Independent
School District v. Kirby, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Kukor v. Grover,
rejected a challenge to the state's school finance system based on the state
constitution's education clause. A court in Illinois may be influenced by the
court's reasoning in Kukor.
An argument that an Illinois court 9hould follow the reasoning in Kukor v.
Grover 7 9 has no merit. In Kukor, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin's Category II education clause4 80 did not require the state to meet
the needs of students in property-poor school districts.481 Consequently, the
court concluded that the state's equalization system was even more responsive
than necessary to the needs of disadvantaged students. 482
However, an Illinois court interpreting the Illinois clause should not reach
the same result. In Kukor, the court necessarily found that the education
clause's mandate that the state provide public schools that are "as uniform as
practicable" did not even apply to public school finance. Instead, the mandate
applied to the substantive curriculum offered in public schools.483 Thus, in
Wisconsin's education clause, "uniformity" requires all public schools to offer
substantially the same curriculum. In contrast, Illinois courts have held that,
although the education clause imposes no specific duty on the state regarding
public school finance, the clause clearly applies to public school finance in
some capacity.4 8 ' Indeed, the mere fact that the clause explicitly mentions
public school finance demonstrates that the issue is within the scope of the
clause. Thus, the Kukor decision should not influence an Illinois court, since
Wisconsin courts and Illinois courts have clearly defined the scopes of their
state education clauses quite differently.
In sum, if the Illinois courts would reconsider the Illinois education clause in
light of the recent decisions in New Jersey, Texas, and Washington, the clause
would become an effective tool to strike down the school finance system
in Illinois. The Abbott and Kirby decisions undermine Illinois' restrictive in-
terpretation of its education clause. Using a more well reasoned interpretation,
ing text (Texas).
478. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing the characteristics of a Category I
education clause).
479. 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
480. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (describing the characteristics of a Cate-
gory II education clause).
481. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 585.
482. id. at 577.
483. Id. at 577-78.
484. See BURESH, supra note 273, at 125 (Illinois Constitutional Convention Education Com-




Illinois' clause clearly renders the present school finance system unconsti-
tutional.
D. The Fundamental Right to Education in Illinois
Another basis for striking down the public school finance system in Illinois
is the equal protection clause in the Illinois Constitution. In the past, Illinois
courts have not properly applied the federal equal protection analysis that they
claim to adopt." 5 Their refusal to consider whether the Illinois Constitution
guarantees the right to an adequate education is unfounded. However, recent
litigation in Illinois provides an alternative analysis that arguably acknowl-
edges that a fundamental right to education exists in Illinois. A fair considera-
tion of the Illinois Constitution in light of modern equal protection adjudica-
tion reveals that the right to an adequate education is a fundamental right in
Illinois.
The delegates to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention added an equal
protection clause to the 1970 Illinois Constitution's bill of rights. "' They in-
tended the clause to embody the same concepts as the Federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause.48 7 Thus, Illinois courts have adopted federal equal protection
analysis.488 Importantly, Illinois courts have claimed to adopt the criteria of
the United States Supreme Court for a suspect class and for a fundamental
right.'89 Accordingly, past Illinois decisions concerning public school finance
have not articulated a fundamental right to an adequate education.' 90
People ex rel. Jones v. Adams91 demonstrates the Illinois courts' adoption
of the United States Supreme Court's fundamental rights analysis in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez."82 In Adams, the Illinois
court correctly acknowledged that the Court in Rodriguez had applied a more
restrictive standard of review than just minimal scrutiny.8 3 The Adams court
interpreted the Rodriguez test as allowing discrimination among school dis-
tricts in the form of unequal expenditures per pupil, as long as such discrimi-
nation was not invidious.49' Furthermore, the court measured invidiousness by:
(1) the adequacy of the education provided by the state; and (2) the size of
485. See, e.g., People ex tel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (I11. App. Ct. 1976) (striking
down an equal protection challenge to Illinois' school finance system).
486. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
487. See 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 19.
488. See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
489. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 310-22 and accompanying text. But cf. Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1299 (II1. 1990) (suggesting that the 1970 Illinois Constitution guaran-
tees the fundamental right to an education); supra notes 323-28 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Fumarolo decision).
491. 350 N.E.2d 767 (III. App. Ct. 1976).
492. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
493. Adams, 350 N.E.2d at 776.
494. Id.
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the disparity in expenditures per pupil between school districts. 95
The Adams court's analysis, while purporting to adopt the Rodriguez test,
failed to apply it correctly. To the Adams court, the lack of a finding of "in-
vidiousness" was dispositive.'O" Without it, the court found that a public school
finance system could not deny equal protection of the laws to students in any
school district. 97 Actually, a finding of invidiousness does not control equal
protection analysis under "fundamental rights" cases such as Rodriguez. In-
stead, the beginning point of any fundamental rights analysis is to ask whether
the "right" in question is indeed fundamental. 98 Under the Rodriguez test, a
right is fundamental when the Constitution explicitly or implicitly guarantees
it.4 9 Therefore, in an attack based upon the Illinois education clause, if the
1970 Illinois Constitution explicitly or implicitly guarantees the right to an
adequate education, Illinois courts must find the right to an adequate educa-
tion fundamental. Consequently, those courts should apply strict scrutiny to
any legislation which infringes on the right to receive a constitutionally ade-
quate education. 500
Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education °1 more accurately represents
fundamental rights analysis under the state equal protection clause. While the
dispute in Fumarolo did not involve school finance, it did focus on the public's
interest in the operation of public schools.5"' There, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that education has been a compelling state interest since the education
clause in the 1970 Illinois Constitution made the educational development of
all persons a "fundamental goal" of the state. 503 Furthermore, the court noted
that the operation of schools was "a fundamental governmental activity in
which all members of society [had] an interest."50' Consequently, the voting
scheme for school board elections, which deprived voting power from a sub-
stantial portion of the electorate, violated the equal protection clause.505
Fumarolo thus accurately represents the relationship between the preamble of
the education clause-"A fundamental goal of the people of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their capaci-




498. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 33-34 (stating that the critical inquiry in a fundamental rights




501. 566 N.E.2d 1283 (III. 1990).
502. Petitioners in Fumarolo challenged the voting scheme in the Chicago School Reform Act,
Pub. Act No. 85-1418 (codified in scattered sections of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 34 (1989)).
Fumarolo, 566 N.E.2d at 1286.
503. Fumarolo, 566 N.E.2d at 1299.
504. Id. at 1298.
505. Id. at 1299.
506. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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antee the right to an adequate education, and thus articulate a fundamental
right to an adequate education. 08
An examination of the 1970 Illinois Constitution supports the proposition
that the constitution articulates the fundamental right to an adequate educa-
tion. The education clause mandates that the state "shall provide for an effi-
cient system of high quality public educational institutions and services." 509
Furthermore, the state has the "primary responsibility for financing the sys-
tem of public education."5'10 The clause defines an adequate education as one
that allows all persons the opportunity to attend efficient, high quality public
schools, where they will have the opportunity to develop themselves to the lim-
its of their abilities.51 Thus, the education clause orders the state to establish
efficient and high quality public schools in order to provide an adequate educa-
tion, and it affirmatively places the primary responsibility for financing public
schools on the state. Therefore, the state, through its constitution, guarantees
these services to its citizens. While the Illinois Constitution mentions some
non-fundamental governmental services, 5' 2 it guarantees only fundamental
rights.5 13 The mentioning of certain services in the Illinois Constitution only
grants the General Assembly the authority to act in those areas,51" while the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution require the Gen-
eral Assembly to act.51 5 Thus, since the Illinois Constitution implicitly guaran-
tees the right to an adequate education under the Rodriguez test, the Illinois
courts should find that education is a fundamental right. Accordingly, the
courts should apply strict scrutiny to any state action that infringes on the
right to an adequate education.516
United States Supreme Court decisions concerning education undercut any
argument that education is social or economic legislation and thus subject to
only minimal scrutiny.517 The Supreme Court has held that, while public edu-
507. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
508. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34 (holding that a right is fundamental if the Constitution
implicitly or explicitly guarantees it).
509. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (emphasis added).
510. Id. (emphasis added).
511. See 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 234.
512. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (public transportation).
513. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. III, § I (the right to vote).
514. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 ("Public transportation is an essential public purpose
for which public funds may be expended.") (emphasis added).
515. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. III, § I ("Every United States citizen who has attained the age
of 21 or any other voting age required by the United States for voting ... shall have the right to
vote at such election.") (emphasis added).
516. Other state courts have found that education is a fundamental right under the equal pro-
tection clauses of their constitutions. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980),
cert. denied. 449 U.S. 824 (1981).
517. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny to strike
down a statute that denied a free public education to children of illegally admitted aliens).
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cation is not a "right" guaranteed to all persons by the Federal Constitu-
tion,518 it is not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from
other social welfare legislation." 19 Education has a "fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society."5 20 Not surprisingly, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that providing an education is the most important
function of any state.621 Consequently, since Illinois courts have adopted fed-
eral equal protection analysis, they must apply heightened scrutiny to a public
school finance system that deprives, interferes with, impinges upon, or elimi-
nates the right of any student to an adequate education.522 As argued above,
that heightened scrutiny must be strict scrutiny since education is a funda-
mental right in Illinois.
A petitioner before an Illinois court would have to demonstrate that the
public school finance system affected his or her fundamental right to an ade-
quate education before the court would apply strict scrutiny in its evaluation
of the finance system.528 The public school finance system in Illinois affects the
fundamental right to an adequate education because it denies students from
poor school districts an "equal educational opportunity." The system treats
students in poor school districts and students in wealthy school districts un-
equally in a way that denies students from poor school districts an equal edu-
cational opportunity. Consequently, the finance system violates the equal pro-
tection clause.
The court's decision in People ex rel. Jones v. Adams fails to articulate that
the Federal Equal Protection Clause,- and therefore the Illinois equal protec-
tion clause, guarantees the right to an "equal educational opportunity."52' The
equal protection clause guarantees "equal access . . . [to education] sufficient
to confer some educational benefit."525 The Adams court properly noted that
both the adequacy of the public education and the size of the disparity in per-
pupil expenditures were important factors in considering whether the public
school finance system violated the equal protection clause.5 6 However, it
failed to consider the focus of the equal protection clause itself-whether the
state action denies equal opportunity to all similarly situated persons.5 2 Thus,
the Adams test fails to correctly apply the equal protection clause because it
518. Id. at 221.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 273 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954).
522. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme Court equal protec-
tion jurisprudence in the area of public education).
523. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
524. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982).
525. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
526. See People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
527. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (noting that the basic premise of the Equal




does not consider the basic tenet of the equal protection clause-that the gov-
ernment deal with similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.528
Establishing a violation of the equal protection clause does not require proof
of an absolute deprivation of a fundamental right. The Adams test seems to
require a showing that the school finance system deprives someone of an ade-
quate education.529 However, a more accurate interpretation of the equal pro-
tection clause requires only a showing of unequal treatment to establish a vio-
lation; for example, an inhibition of some individual's or some group's equal
access to a fundamental right.58 0 Thus, a more equitable test for Illinois to
apply is whether the public school finance system treats someone unequally, so
as to deny or inhibit his or her fundamental right to obtain an education in an
efficient, high quality public educational institution.53 1
Applying this test, an Illinois court should find that the Illinois public school
finance system treats students in poor school districts differently from students
in wealthy school districts so as to deny or inhibit the ability of students in
poor school districts to exercise their fundamental right to obtain an adequate
education. Students who live in property-poor districts receive an inferior edu-
cational opportunity as compared to their counterparts in wealthy school dis-
tricts. Each student in the wealthiest school districts has approximately six
times the amount spent for his education as a student in the poorest dis-
tricts.53 2 Accordingly, the educational resources in the wealthiest districts are
superior to those that the poorest districts provide.5" The vast disparity in per-
pupil spending directly affects the educational resources available to the stu-
dents, and this constitutes a denial of equal treatment of students entitled to
receive an equal educational opportunity from the state.5 " The unequal treat-
ment infringes upon the students' fundamental right to receive an adequate
education-an education from an efficient, high quality public educational
528. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
529. See Adams, 350 N.E.2d at 776. There, plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that their
school district did not spend even a substantially equal amount of money per pupil; pupils in their
district had $165 less spent on each of them for their education than the state average, despite
their district's higher-than-average tax rate. Id. at 775. Thus, students in their district were
treated unequally, with respect to education, as compared to students in other districts. Conse-
quently, it appears that a court using the Adams test would allow significant disparity in per-pupil
expenditures for education if students in a property-poor district were receiving simply a basic
education, albeit inferior to the education being provided in wealthier districts. Plaintiffs from a
property-poor district would have to prove deprivation of a basic education.
530. See supra note 39 (discussing Professor Nowak's six substantive categories of fundamental
rights).
531. This test properly expresses the relationship between the 1970 constitution's education
clause and equal protection clause. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (noting that an
education committee member at the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention suggested a similar
test).
532. Burroughs & Leininger, supra note 7, at 144.
533. See BURROUGHS & LEININGER, supra note 235, at 145.
534. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 804 (Md. 1983) (Cole, J.
dissenting).
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institution.
Since the Illinois public school finance system infringes upon a group's fun-
damental right to receive an adequate education, an Illinois court must ex-
amine the system under strict scrutiny.585 Thus, the state would have to
demonstrate that the finance system is necessarily related to a compelling in-
terest.586 It is unlikely that any interest advanced by the state would survive
strict scrutiny analysis. Legislation subject to strict scrutiny is nearly always
struck down under an analysis that is "strict in theory and fatal in fact. 587
Illinois should apply strict scrutiny to public education finance systems.
Fumarolo discussed the stringent requirements of strict scrutiny: (1) the legis-
lation must advance a compelling state interest; (2) the legislation must be
necessary to attain the compelling state interest; and (3) the provisions in the
legislation must be the least restrictive means available to attain the compel-
ling state interest.5 38 While it is impossible to ascertain every interest which
the state could advance as "compelling," it is likely that the state would claim
that preservation of local control over school districts justifies the school fi-
nance system.589 However, in Illinois such an interest is only "valid," and not
"compelling." '40 Thus, it does not meet the demands of strict scrutiny. Fur-
thermore, a school finance scheme that depends on property taxes for fifty-four
percent of its receipts 41 is not necessary to preserve local control over school
districts. Nationally, property taxes account for only about forty-four percent
of the required funds for public education.5 42 This clearly indicates that other
states are able to fund their public schools with less reliance on property taxes.
Finally, a finance system that relies on local property taxes to supply such a
substantial portion of funding for education is clearly not the least restrictive
means to preserve local control of education. In fact, such a finance system is
underinclusive with respect to preserving local control over education. Under
the present finance system, only the wealthy school districts that can raise
substantial local revenues truly exert local control over their public schools.
Only these school districts have the ability to offer to their pupils choices in
curriculum, extensive extracurricular activities, and the best teachers. On the
other hand, the poorer school districts cannot raise sufficient funds to offer
535. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that a court should apply strict scrutiny
where state action affects the abilities of people to exercise a fundamental right).
536. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (articulating the strict scrutiny standard).
537. Gunther, supra note 37, at 8; see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 317-27 (1976) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (discussing at length the strict scrutiny standard of
review).
538. Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1291 (Ill. 1990).
539. See, e.g., People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (state ar-
gued that local control over schools was rationally related to the property tax-based finance
system).
540. Id. at 776 (stating that the principle of local control over public schools is only a valid
state interest).
541. See BURROUGHS & LEININGER, supra note 235, at 19.
542. Fairness in Funding Illinois Schools, supra note 235, at 10.
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their students choices in curriculum or in extracurricular activities. Further-
more, these districts cannot simply decide to provide superior facilities or
teachers. In sum, lack of money for education preempts any true control over
education in the poorer school districts. Thus, the present school finance sys-
tem in Illinois cannot withstand analysis under strict scrutiny. Accordingly, a
court that adjudicates an equal protection challenge to the finance system
must strike it down as unconstitutional.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ILLINOIS' PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM
A judicial determination that the Illinois public school finance system vio-
lates the Illinois Constitution only acknowledges that a problem exists with
public education in Illinois. The Illinois Constitution guarantees students
much more than that. The General Assembly must put into place a constitu-
tional public school finance system-one that ensures efficient and high quality
public schools. The public school system must grant an appropriate education
to each student, in light of his or her individual needs.
The important question still remains: how can the state provide a constitu-
tional public school finance system? This Comment does not attempt to pro-
pose a constitutional system. However, it is clear that the state must guarantee
more funding-enough to provide a constitutionally adequate education for all
students in Illinois. The state must have enough money to spend in favor of
disadvantaged students from poor school districts so that they receive an edu-
cation that allows them to compete in the marketplace with relatively ad-
vantaged students.
A constitutional system does not contemplate equal per-pupil spending. Nor
does it contemplate decreasing the disparity in per-pupil spending for educa-
tion by "scaling down" the amount of money that wealthier school districts
can choose to grant for public education through higher property taxes. That
would only penalize the school districts who are providing a more than ade-
quate educational opportunity to their students. A public school finance system
meeting the constitutional mandate would, however, require the state to grant
more money to relatively disadvantaged students in poorer school districts.
Likewise, the poorer school districts should receive more state funding than
wealthier school districts receive. Each pupil in the poorer school districts
must have enough money spent on him or her to guarantee the opportunity for
that pupil to obtain an appropriate education from an efficient, high quality
institution. The present state aid system does not guarantee funds sufficient to
grant all students the equal educational opportunity to obtain an adequate ed-
ucation. Thus, the state must contribute more money to public education.
Where can the State of Illinois obtain the additional necessary funds? An
increase in the income tax rate may be the answer. The base income tax rate
in Illinois is 2.5 % for individuals and 4 % for corporations.5 ,3 For the next two
years, the state will impose a 3 % tax on an individual's income and a 4.8%
543. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2-201 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
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tax on a corporation's income; but, after July 1, 1993, the income tax rates
will drop to 2.75% on individual income and to 4.4% on corporate income. 5"
The General Assembly could significantly increase the amount of money avail-
able for education by increasing the base income tax rate to 5-6% on an indi-
vidual's income, and to 8-9% on a corporation's income. The state could also
provide more funds for education by increasing the percentage of total income
tax revenues allocated to education. Currently, through its Education Assis-
tance Fund, Illinois allocates 7.3% of the total income tax revenues to public
primary, secondary, and higher education.54 5 The state could consider increas-
ing the percentage of revenues devoted to education to reflect a greater state
role in supporting public education.
In addition, the General Assembly should reduce the total number of units
requiring state aid. The legislature should decrease the total number of school
districts in Illinois by forming county-wide districts outside Cook County and
township districts within Cook County. Increasing the amount of state funding
for education while decreasing the sheer number of school districts would al-
low the state to spend in favor of school districts that need funding the
most-districts unable to raise sufficient funds via the property tax.
A judicial determination that the Illinois public school finance system is un-
constitutional would also have other, far-reaching effects. While it is difficult
to predict the effect such a decision would have on the quality of education in
Illinois, it is clear that invalidating the school finance system via any of the
four suggested means would greatly affect the Illinois judiciary's role in public
education.
An immediate impact would be the realization that questions concerning the
constitutional adequacy of Illinois public schools should no longer rest with the
General Assembly. Thus, a decision that the public school finance system is
unconstitutional would overrule a long line of precedent in Illinois. 46 Further-
more, for the first time, Illinois would align its interpretation of what consti-
tutes "efficient" and "high quality" schools with other states' interpretations of
similar mandates. 547
The increased power of the judiciary in the school finance area would not be
inconsequential. Illinois courts would be able to require more state funding to
support poor, relatively disadvantaged school districts. Consequently, a deter-
mination that the present finance system violates the Illinois Constitution may
in effect overrule decisions such as Blase v. State 48-the judicial branch of
government in Illinois may be able to mandate that the state provide not less
than fifty percent of the funds necessary to operate and maintain public
schools. Clearly, this would allow poor school districts to provide their rela-
544. Act of July 25, 1991, Pub. Act No. 87-17 (Ill. Gen. Assembly).
545. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, para. 9-901 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
546. See supra notes 296-330 and accompanying text.
547. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (using
Washington's Category IV education clause to strike down the state's school finance system).
548. 302 N.E.2d 46 (III. 1973).
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tively disadvantaged students with the services they need in order to receive an
"equal educational opportunity."
Finally, a judicial determination that the finance system violates the Illinois
Constitution would affect the relationship between the General Assembly and
the Illinois courts regarding the means by which Illinois funds its public
schools. Currently, approximately fifty-four percent of the funding for local
school districts comes from local property taxes; the state provides only about
thirty-eight percent of the required funding." Nationally, property taxes ac-
count for only about 43.6 percent of the required funds for public education.550
Thus, in striking down the finance system in Illinois, the judiciary would send
a clear message to the General Assembly that it must de-emphasize the prop-
erty tax, and instead devise a more equitable way to fund public schools that
will not deprive students in poor school districts of an adequate education. The
General Assembly's answer would likely come in the form of an income tax
increase or a tax on services. In any event, the judiciary would abandon its
deferential stance toward public school finance, and in its place would estab-
lish guidelines for future finance schemes in Illinois.
While, as previously noted, the effect that school finance reform would have
on Illinois public schools is difficult to determine, results in other states may
predict possible effects in Illinois. In Kentucky, where the state supreme court
held that the entire state education system was unconstitutional, the state's
General Assembly passed a law which provided a twenty-five percent increase
in funding for poor schools and a five percent increase in funding for wealthy
schools.551 Furthermore, the law increased the minimum spending level per
student by $1100 for the poorest school districts.5 52 Finally, the funding
scheme embodies a reward for school districts that upgrade their performance,
and a monitoring program for districts failing to improve their performance. 5 "
Such a system may prove to represent a suitable compromise between quality
and equality.
It is unlikely that a court's determination that the Illinois school finance
system is unconstitutional would result in the sort of drastic changes to the
education system made in Kentucky. Such a determination, however, would
open the doors to judicial intervention in the school finance area. Conse-
quently, the courts could effectively mandate an equitable system that would
provide all persons with an appropriate education. More importantly, such a
determination would allow the judiciary to monitor future public school fi-
nancing in Illinois to insure that it meets the constitutional standards discussed
above.
549. See Fairness in Funding Illinois Schools, supra note 235, at 10.
550. Id.
551. Ginny Carroll, Who Foots the Bill?, NEWSWEEK, Fall/Winter 1990, at 81, 82-84 (Special
Edition: Education: A Consumer's Handbook).
552. Id. at 84.
553. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The present public school finance system in Illinois is unconstitutional. It
fails to provide "efficient" and "high quality" 5'6 4 public schools in every school
district. It fails to provide an "equal educational opportunity" 55 for all per-
sons so that they will have the opportunity to develop themselves "to the limits
of their capacities. "55 The state has failed to assume the "primary responsibil-
ity" 57 to provide a constitutional public school system in which all persons
receive an "appropriate" education.558
This Comment suggests four possible means by which a court could deter-
mine that the school finance system violates the Illinois Constitution. Regard-
less of the means a court uses to reach the conclusion that the system is un-
constitutional, the court should hold that a constitutional system does not
require equal per-pupil expenditures. Instead, the court should hold that a con-
stitutional system contemplates providing enough funding to each school dis-
trict so that all persons have an equal educational opportunity to receive an
appropriate education. Thus, a constitutional finance system contemplates une-
qual spending in favor of relatively disadvantaged students in poor school dis-.
tricts; for without additional funds in those districts, many students would not
receive an appropriate education that would place them on an "even field"
with relatively advantaged students. Furthermore, the system should not de-
crease per-pupil spending in wealthy school districts, but should increase per-
pupil spending in poor school districts in order to gradually eliminate the enor-
mous disparities in spending between poor and wealthy districts. Such a sys-
tem cannot heavily rely on the property tax, but instead must rely on alterna-
tive sources of funding.
David J. Sheikh
554. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
555. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (noting that the delegates to the 1970
Illinois Constitutional Convention intended the new education clause to provide each student with
an equal educational opportunity); see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982)
(articulating the right to an "equal educational opportunity" under the Federal Equal Protection
Clause).
556. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
557. Id.
558. See supra notes 331-37 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois decisions regarding
public education for the handicapped that recognize the right to an "appropriate" education for
all students).
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